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Abstract 
 
Public investment decisions are important firstly because the tax-payer’s money should be wisely spent, 
secondly since the government can use its large market share to potentially steer the economy towards 
goals such as sustainability, and finally because questions of equality can be addressed in public 
investments. Rational investment decisions should aim to maximise societal welfare, and this can be 
best achieved in a second best world by using Cost-Benefit Analysis.  
 
The choice of a Social Discount Rate to use in Cost-Benefit Analysis has long been a topic in 
economics. The most used choice rule for the discount rate is the Ramsey equation, which is derived 
formally in the thesis. To account for uncertainty, a social risk premium, instead of certainty equivalents 
is proposed to be used in Cost-Benefit Analysis. An expression for the risk premium is formally derived 
in the Ramsey equation. 
 
To examine the need for a risk premium in the Social Discount Rate, the Arrow-Lind theorem is first 
derived to show, that by risk pooling the public investor can forgo the risk premium. Then, two 
extensions are integrated to the basic model, wherein first, the effects of an environmental externality, 
introduced as a ’public bad’, and second, the effects of varying degrees of benefit rivalry under different 
risk aversion profiles, are examined.  
 
The Arrow-Lind theorem is shown to hold in the ’public bad’ case, if Hicks-Kaldor compensations were 
actually carried out. In the second case, the theorem is shown to hold, even with private project benefits, 
if individuals’ relative risk aversion and relative prudence are low enough. 
 
If the society’s risk aversion profiles can be adequately estimated and they fulfil the criteria defined in the 
thesis, then the use of a risk premium in the discount rate can be justifiably given up. Finally, the thesis 
concludes, that different choice rules for the Social Discount Rate should be used based on the 
individual characteristics of the investment under consideration. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Julkiset investointipäätökset ovat tärkeitä ensinnäkin siksi, että veronmaksajien rahoja tulisi käyttää järkevästi, toiseksi siksi, että 
valtio voi käyttää suurta markkinaosuuttaan ohjatakseen taloutta kohti tavoitteita kuten kestävyys, ja kolmanneksi siksi, että tasa-
arvoon liittyviä kysymyksiä voidaan huomioida julkisissa investoinneissa. Rationaalinen investointipäätös tähtää yhteiskunnallisen 
hyvinvoinnin maksimointiin ja second best –maailmassa tämän saavuttaa parhaiten kustannus-hyötyanalyysi. 
 
Yhteiskunnallisen diskonttokoron valinta kustannus-hyötyanalyysia varten on pitkään ollut talousteoreettisen keskustelun aiheena. 
Eniten käytetty sääntö sen valintaan on Ramseyn yhtälö, joka johdetaan muodollisesti tutkielmassa. Epävarmuuden huomioon 
ottamiseksi tutkielmassa ehdotetaan yhteiskunnallisen riskipreemion käyttämistä varmuusekvivalenttien sijaan. Matemaattinen 
muoto riskipreemiolle johdetaan osaksi Ramseyn yhtälöä. 
 
Yhteiskunnallisen riskipreemion tarpeellisuuden tarkastelemiseksi, johdetaan tutkielmassa ensin Arrow-Lind -teoreema, joka 
osoittaa että väestön määrän ollessa riittävän suuri voidaan riskipreemio sivuuttaa. Alkuperäiseen malliin liitetään sitten kaksi 
laajennusta, joista ensimmäisessä ympäristöulkoisvaikutusten, jotka tulkitaan julkishaitakkeeksi, vaikutuksia ja jälkimmäisessä eri 
asteisen hyötyjen kilpailullisuuden vaikutuksia eri riskinkaihtamisprofiilien vallitessa tarkastellaan. 
 
Arrow-Lind –teoreeman tulosten näytetään pitävän julkishaitakkeen tapauksessa, jos Hicks-Kaldor hyvitykset todella maksetaan. 
Jälkimmäisessä tapauksessa teoreeman tulokset pitävät, jopa yksityishyödykkeen omaisten projektin hyötyjen tapauksessa, jos 
yksilöiden suhteellisen riskinkarttamisen aste sekä suhteellinen varovaisuus ovat tarpeeksi alhaiset. 
 
Jos yhteiskunnan riskinkaihtamisprofiileja on mahdollista tarpeeksi tarkasti arvioida ja tämä täyttäisi tutkielmassa määritellyt 
kriteerit, voidaan yhteiskunnallista riskipreemiota perustellusti jättää käyttämättä. Lopuksi, tutkielmassa todetaan, että erilaisia 
yhteiskunnallisen diskonttokoron valintasääntöjä tulisi käyttää harkinnan mukaisesti tapauskohtaisesti. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The choice of a Social Discount Rate, to be used in public investments, might
seem like a dry or exceedingly theoretical topic of discussion. Altering the
discount rate, however, can have drastic impacts on the results of a study on the
profitability of any given project, especially in the case of long term investments,
such as climate policy or large infrastructure. The correct way of choosing a
Social Discount Rate has remained the topic of academic discussions from the
days of Ramsey (1928) and Pigou (1962), through the 1960s and 1970s (Sen,
1967; Marglin, 1969; Arrow and Lind, 1970), on to modern economists such as
Gollier (2010), Weitzman (2010), and Dietz et al. (2015). On a less theoretical
level, the choice of a suitable discount rate has been of increasing interest in
public discussion during the past decades, as is evident from, say, the discussion
sparked by the Stern Review (Stern et al., 2006). One of the main contributors
to the discussion, Martin L. Weitzman, thus aptly characterises the choice of a
Social Discount Rate as “the perennial dilemma” (Weitzman, 2001).
From an economist’s perspective, public investment decisions should aim to
maximise social welfare. From a theoretical point of view, and in a first best
world1, the way to achieve this would be to use a social welfare function, which
is, in a utilitarian setting, an aggregation of the individual utility functions of the
individuals in the society, and which thus represents the society’s preferences
(Jehle and Reny, 2011). The empirical estimation of the shape of a societal
1I.e. with a perfectly functioning economy.
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welfare functions in diﬀerent investment situations in the second best world we
live in is, however, very diﬃcult, if not impossible (Tuomala, 2009). A more
easily implemented alternative that economic theory has oﬀered for making
economically rational choices, which aim at maximising societal utility in public
investment decisions, is called Cost-Benefit Analysis.
Investment decisions under uncertainty have been the topic of a plethora of
economic papers, especially during the last three decades. The booming of the
financial sector accompanied by the ever growing computational powers of com-
puters has led to more and more sophisticated theoretical models and decision-
making methods. However, public investment decisions have seen remarkably
little attention. This can, of course, be partly because economic theory already
oﬀers a ’ready’ set of theoretical tools in Cost-Benefit Analysis. The theoret-
ical body of Cost-Benefit Analysis is, nowadays, well formed, but not without
its problems. The three main, partially intertwined, problems in Cost-Benefit
Analysis that are addressed in this study are those of social discounting, coping
with uncertainty, and accounting for externalities.
Given the often long time scales of public investment projects, logically the costs
and benefits occuring at diﬀerent time periods should be made commensurable.
This is done by discounting, which, in turn, gives rise to the need for a correct
Social Discount Rate. The choice of discount rate for public projects, unlike
public investment decisions per se, has remained a relevant topic in economic
theory, as previously mentioned. There is no unanimity regarding the choice
of a Social Discount Rate. However, the so called Ramsey equation (Ramsey,
1928) has fixed its place as the most widely used definition of a Social Discount
Rate, and is used, for example, as the basis of the recent survey by Drupp et al.
(2015). The Ramsey equation defines the Social Discount Rate as a function of
the social time-preference rate, the growth rate of per capita consumption and
relative risk aversion.
The second problem, uncertainty is defined in my thesis, following Pearce (1983),
as a situation where the probability distribution of possible costs and benefits of
a project is unknown, a priori. In Cost-Benefit Analysis, the optimal approach
to coping with uncertainty would be to estimate the probability distributions
either based on previous experience or on the opinions of experts. A problem
with using the expected values of costs and benefits given the probability distri-
bution that is derived, is that they do not account for the level of risk aversion
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
Country\Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Finland 3.7% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.1%
Sweden 4.5% 4.4% 4.6% 4.5% 4.5%
UK 3.2% 3.0% 2.8% 2.6% 2.7%
USA 4.1% 3.9% 3.6% 3.4% 3.3%
Table 1.1: Public investments as a %-share of GDP, 2010-2014 (source: Euro-
stat, OECD.Stat)
the individuals in the society exhibit. This can be remedied by using expected
utility instead of expected values, though here again problems arise given the dif-
ficulty of estimating the utility functions of individuals. Theory suggests using
expected utility and the calculation of so called certainty equivalent values, to
be used in Cost-Benefit Analysis. An alternative to calculating certainty equiv-
alents is the introduction of a societal risk premium into the Social Discount
Rate.
This choice of a Social Discount Rate and diﬀerent approaches to coping with
uncertainty or externalities make for good topics in academic papers, but do
the answers to these questions matter in practice? I argue, that public invest-
ment decisions do matter, for a number of reasons. Firstly, quite self-evidently
the tax-payer’s money should be wisely spent. Secondly, governments can use
their large market shares to steer the economy towards goals besides economic
eﬃciency, by the inclusion of other than purely monetary criteria in investment
decisions, for example, towards a more ecologically sustainable path. Since, if
the government makes up a adequately large proportion of any given market,
it can either set precedents or exploit its monopsony power when the objects of
investment are partially privately produced. Finally, it is in public investments,
more than elsewhere, that questions of equality and intergenerational equality
can and even need to be addressed, given the wide impacts they potentially
yield both temporally across generations and contemporaneously between the
individuals that make up the society. All of this is, of course, one reason that
such investments are public in the first place (e.g., Tuomala, 2009).
Public investments can be defined as one possible way of a government to pro-
mote economic growth and welfare in the society. Government in diﬀerent coun-
tries undertake investments in both long-term projects like public infrastructure,
and policy reforms, such as investments in R&D, health care or education. These
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investments are undertaken either as counter-cyclical policies, or to foster pro-
ductivity and economic growth.
Given the second argument, that governments should utilise their large market
shares, it can be asked, how large are the market shares of governments? Table
1.1 shows the %-share of GDP of Public gross fixed capital formation in Finland
as well as a few comparison countries. Public, or, government gross fixed capital
formation is usually what is meant, when talking about public investments. The
numbers in table 1.1 are based on the System of National Accounts (SNA), which
is a set of internationally standardised definitions and classifications for national
accounting. The SNA’s definition of public investments is at present defined as
Gross fixed capital formation and acquisitions, less disposals of non-produced
non-financial assets (OECD, 2015). Thus, both ’material’ and ’immaterial’
investments are included in the figures. The respective percentage figures for
the Euro area vary on both sides of 3% for the years 2010-2014.
Another way of acquiring an idea of just how much is spent in public investments
is to look at public investment’s %-share of total government expenditures.
According to OECD (2015) government investments in the OECD-area made
up 7.8% of total government expenditures in 2013, though during the financial
crisis that started in 2008, the level of public investments has been decreasing,
because of the adoption of austerity programmes.
Perhaps an even more enlighting angle is to inspect ratio of public investments
to total investments, since it was above mentioned that governments could use
their relatively big market share. Table 1.2 shows public investments %-shares of
total investment, which includes the investment spending of the entire economy.
The public investment share of total investments seems to move between 10%
and 20%, and the OECD average in 2013 of 15.9% (OECD, 2015) confirms this
estimate.
Now, using this rough estimate of approximately 15% market share, it can be
well thought, that the choices of government investments can have an impact
on the markets. Thus, the quite generally acknowledged goal of aiming for a
environmentally, socially and economically sustainable economy can be striven
for, by valuing, for example, environmental issues in public investment decisions.
Thus, public investment decisions matter.
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Country\Year 2007 2009 2013
Finland 13.3% 18.7% 19.5%
Sweden 15.9% 20.5% 20.2%
UK 12.7% 22.3% 14.9%
USA 17.4% 24.2% 17.5%
Table 1.2: Public investment as a %-share of total investment, 2007, 2009, 2013
(Source: OECD.Stat)
In addition to public investments, the role of public procurement in steering
private producers to sought after goals is worth mentioning. Public procure-
ment can be defined to be a special case of public investment, which is strictly
regulated by EU directives and national legislation. Public procurement and
public investment are only partially overlapping categories, since even goods
more akin to consumption goods can be procured. A considerable amount of
money circulates in public procurement, as for example in Finland they amount
to around 30 billion euros, or approximately 20% of GDP, annually. Thus, pub-
lic procurement most definitely ’matters’, and its use as a means of achieving
goals such as sustainability has been the topic of both academic and practical
discussions.2 Further, where as public investments utilise Cost-Benefit Analysis,
a similar method, Life-Cycle Costing has been increasingly taken up in public
procurement decisions (see e.g., Gluch and Baumann, 2004; Pursimo, 2015).
The questions I try to answer in my thesis are the following:
• How should the social discount rate be chosen given diﬀerent assumptions
about the project under assessment? Particularly, what if the project’s
benefits are public goods and what if they are private goods?
• How is the social discount rate aﬀected, if environmental externalities are
accounted for? Can the externalities be thought of as a ’public bad’ and
acknowledged by adjusting the risk premium of the social discount rate?
• How do these theoretical suggestions compare to actual discount rate
choices made by public authorities?
The use of a risk premium in social discounting seems like an enticing idea,
given the diﬃculty of calculating certainty equivalents in a project assessment
2See, e.g., Alhola (2012), Lundberg et al. (2015).
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context, and the Ramsey equation can be modified accordingly, introducing an
expression for the social risk premium. The use of risk pooling, or diversification,
would, however, seem intuitively logical in the context of public investments,
and it precisely the idea of risk pooling that Arrow and Lind (1970) exploit in
their seminal article, which proves the result, that, given certain assumptions,
the social risk premium tends to zero as the size of the population grows large
– a result known as the Arrow-Lind theorem.
It was later argued, that for the Arrow-Lind theorem to hold, the benefits and
costs that the project yields need to be private goods (e.g., Fisher, 1973; Foldes
and Rees, 1977). In the case of an environmental externality, which can be
thought of as a ’public bad’, the Arrow-Lind model’s results need to be revised.
Particularly, for the theorem to hold, the so called Hicks-Kaldor compensations
from the beneficiaries of the project to the suﬀerers of the externality need to
be actually carried out (Fisher, 1973).
Logically, a further question is to ask, what happens to the theorem’s results
given diﬀerent degrees of rivalry, that is, degrees of ’privateness’ of the projects
benefits. The results should also be examined given diﬀerent risk aversion pro-
files. In a more recent examination of the Arrow-Lind framework, Gallagher and
Snow (2014) examine just these questions, and find that the original model’s
results do hold even with increasing rivalry of the benefits, given assumptions
on the risk aversion profiles of the individuals. More precisely, the relative risk
aversion and the measure of relative prudence need to be small enough for the
theorem to hold.
The focus of this study is on the need of a social risk premium, given diﬀerent
assumptions. This is done by integrating the models of Arrow and Lind (1970),
Fisher (1973) and Gallagher and Snow (2014).
This thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 I present a brief literature
review into past research on the topic. Nex, in 3 I lay out the theoretical
background of public investments and define public investments, social welfare
functions, risk and uncertainty, and the theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis. To
examine the need for a social risk premium in diﬀerent situations, first in chapter
4 I formally derive the Ramsey equation, which defines the social discount rate,
and second present a model in chapter 5 which integrates the models of Arrow
and Lind (1970), Fisher (1973) and Gallagher and Snow (2014), to assess the
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need for a risk premium in social discounting. Finally, chapter 6 discusses and
concludes.
Chapter 2
Literature
In this concise literature review I present relevant theoretical outings, first re-
garding Cost-Benefit Analysis, and then on the topic of Social Discount Rate.
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a method for assessing the profitability of public
projects. Alternatively, it can thought of as a method to be used in maximising
societal utility (Marglin, 1969). According to Marglin, the ideas used in CBA
can be traced back to Jules Dupuit in the 19th century, but as Marglin (1969)
and Pearce (1983) point out, the idea was not put to practice until the Flood
Control Act of 1936 in the USA. Since the 1930s, the use of CBA has spread
widely and the theory, upon which it is based, has grown more cohesive, as is
evident from the text-book type manuals on calculating it, published from the
early 1970s onward.1
CBA, or other methods like it, has since then been used by many governments,
particularly in the case of larger, or lengthier, projects, where the possible ben-
efits, or losses, to the society are larger. However, as, for example, Rosen (2005)
points out, even though USA has been a pioneer, when it comes to the use
of these kind of present value methods in assessing public investments, they
are actually seldom used even if the local law would require it. According to
Rosen, the choice of a social discount rate for public project appraisals is also
noncoherent within the US.
1Most notable are perhaps the works by Pearce (1983); Marglin (1969); Mishan (1994), all
of which were iniatially published in late 1960s or early 1970s.
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The use of CBA thus started before the formation of its welfare economical basis
in the 1950s. These welfare economical ideas were the idea that benefits were
any gains and costs any loss in utility, the use of the concept of opportunity cost,
and rooting the idea of net benefit maximisation in the Pareto improvement rule.
(Pearce, 1983).
A further note in the historical formation of CBA is that it emerged from a
practical need, mostly in the context of water resource management (cf. The
Flood Control Act). A relatively early Finnish text on the subject of CBA,
Uimonen (1992), was also published in a book the main topic of which was
water resource management.
In the 1970s CBA gained support from the nascent environmental movement.
Though, it should be noted, the environmentalists were also among those, who
most vocally criticised CBA for its expansion of economical reasoning to natural
resources (Pearce, 1983). At present, the use of CBA is partly argumented for
precisely because of the same reason, that is, acknowledging the environment.
The inclusion of environmental factors in CBA calculations has indeed increased
in recent decades, and has lead to a situation, where the acceptance of invest-
ments based on a CBA without them can be seen as questionable (Tuomala,
2009). The most obvious criticism towards CBA is aimed at it assigning mon-
etary values to non-market goods. Taking this argument further, critics may
claim that the use of CBA would overrule political judgement. Pearce (1983)
addresses this strand of critique, and points out that CBA makes no claims
of making morally correct decisions. Rather, Pearce writes, “[...] CBA is an
’input’, an ’aid’, an ’ingredient’ of decision-making. It does not supplant po-
litical judgement”. A good summary of why the environmentalists should be
advocating the use of CBA, not objecting it is oﬀered in Revesz and Livermore
(2008).
Pearce (1983) further states that CBA is a ’normative’ procedure and answers
critiques of ’subjectivity’ by saying, that the possibility that an analytical tool
is biased by falsifications on behalf of the analyst is not something unique to
CBA, and, not a part of the conceptual structure of CBA. CBA is, of course,
’subjective’ in the sense that it does try to model the subjective preferences of
the individuals in the society. Pearce suggests that not only should the value
judgements that are made be made public, but even that the analysis should
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include a ’value judgement sensitivity analysis’. Such value judgements are
presented in chapter 3, where I go through the theoretical foundations of CBA.
According to Pearce (1983) CBA could also be victim to the so called ’Scitovsky
reversal paradox’. The paradox states that, given suitable preferences, it is pos-
sible that a project that takes society from point A to point B is an improvement
according to CBA, but once there, the move back, from B to A, would also be an
improvement, given the possibility of carrying out Hicks-Kaldor compensations
from the beneficiaries of the project to the suﬀerers of it (Scitovsky, 1941).2
A Hicks-Kaldor improvement, a term based on the works of economists Nicholas
Kaldor and John Hicks, is a weaker optimality condition than Pareto optimality,
and it is defined as follows. Imagine a project yields benefits to a certain group
of consumers, while another group suﬀers from it. Now, if there exists such a
compensation that could be transferred from the beneficiaries to the suﬀerers,
that would leave the suﬀerers as well of as before the project was undertaken,
but still lead to an increase in the well being of the beneficiaries, then this
project is called a Hicks-Kaldor improvement. It should be noted, however, that
the Hicks-Kaldor compensations do not actually have to be carried out. The
problem of intergenerational discounting could theoretically be overcome by the
setting up of an ’intergenerational compensation fund’ to actually carry out the
Hicks-Kaldor compensations (Pearce, 1983). This same result is achieved by
Fisher in his extension of the Arrow-Lind model (1973), and his model is used
in part as a basis for the model presented in chapter 4.
Additional potential pitfalls include, according to Rosen (2005), the chain-
reaction game, labour game and the double-counting game. The chain-reaction
game is a symptom of a biased CBA, as it means that unnecessary secondary
benefits are included in the calculations by the analyst to make the project seem
more tempting, i.e. changes that are actually transfers are counted as benefits.
The second ’game’ is defined as the case when the wages of the workers employed
by the project are read as benefits. The creation of jobs is, of course, a sound
and common political goal, but it is not, however, a benefit in the calculation
of CBA. The double-counting game is the case, when, for example, the selling
price of a land area as well as the potential revenues of farming it were both
2Not to be confused with Scitovsky’s later income-happiness paradox, presented in The
Joyless Economy (1977).
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counted, i.e. double-counting means that two benefits that are exclusionary are
both counted.
CBA is highlightedly a method for public project appraisal, but its similarities
to private investment decisions are, of course, many. Where as a private investor
uses the market prices as a given, and uses them to make profit calculations,
profit cannot usually be used as a decision rule for public investments (Tuomala,
2009). Although the primitive notion that the present and future are not equally
valued is present both in private as well as public investment decisions, the choice
of a discount rate is usually far more complex in public investments. The theory
of social discounting is next discussed shortly, and it is then the focus of chapter
4.
Benefits and costs occuring in diﬀerent periods are discounted in CBA, using
a Social Discount Rate (SDR). The two fundamental arguments for societal
discounting are:
1. social opportunity costs, and
2. a positive societal time-preference
(e.g., Marglin, 1969; Pearce, 1983; Boardman et al., 2014; Drupp et al., 2015).
These arguments give rise to two candidates for the discount rate to be used in
public investment decisions (Tuomala, 2009). The social opportunity cost is the
certain return that the public investor could reap, if an alternative investment
were made, and it is usually denoted with r. A positive time-preference means,
that the individuals in the society value the present over and above the future,
and it is often denoted with s, 1/  or  , of which the last is adopted in the
theoretical models I present in chapter 4.
Heal (2005) equates the social opportunity cost r with the social discount rate,
which is intuitively correct, if r is written as a function of  , among other things.
r can thus be interpreted as either the social opportunity cost, or the equilibrium
market interest rate defined by the preferences of the individuals in the society.
It should be emphasised that this interpretation of r as a market interest rate
is that of a equilibrium interest rate in a perfect economy. Hence, as Tuomala
(2009) points out, if markets do not function flawlessly, then a public investor
should not use the market rate for discounting.
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In Pearce (1983), a simple two period model, the social time preference rate
  and the social opportunity cost r coincide only at the optimum, when the
slopes of the production possibility curve and the social indiﬀerence curve are
the same. In this situation, Pearce writes, it does not matter which rate we
choose for CBA, but since r is far more easily observed than  , we should use
r. In practice the two interest rates seldom coincide. The existence of simple
taxation of firms, for example, leads to r exceeding  .
It should be noted, that   often thought a value judgement, though not without
limits as, for example, Anthoﬀ et al. (2009) cite plausible values of 0-3. The time-
preference rate is also dependent on other characteristics of the individual, and
individuals from lower income percentiles often report higher time-preference
rates (e.g., Lawrance, 1991). The accounting of diﬀerent time-preference rates
in an attempt to achieve increased equality is however, perhaps justifiably left
out of consideration in practical implementations of CBA.
A further explanation for the diﬀerence between r and   is, that individuals
report diﬀering discount rates in isolation and with the knowledge of a societal
decision (Sen, 1967). It should, thus, be decided, whether a discount rate based
solely on r or   is adopted for CBA, or if an approach is adopted that tries to
embody both the social opportunity cost and the social time-preference in the
chosen discount rate. Heal (2005), for example, proposes the use of just the
time-preference rate for long-run economy-wide projects. Usually, however, it
is often logical to formulate a a combination of the two, by writing the discount
rate r as a function of the time-preference   as well as other variables, and use
it instead. In chapter 4 the social discount rate, now denoted ⇢, is thus derived
using the so called Ramsey equation.
The Ramsey equation, based on the original model in the article by Frank
Plumpton Ramsey (1928), has come to play the part of a benchmark model in
discussions of social discounting, especially in the case of very long run projects.3
The initial model by Ramsey was later extended by David Cass (1965) and
Tjalling Koopmans (1965), to a model of economic growth where the savings
decisions of individuals are endogenised. The model is, accordingly, often called
the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. The Ramsey equation states the equilib-
rium interest rate, which is to be used in social discounting, to be equal to the
3The archetypal very long run project is, of course, climate policy aimed at mitigating the
impacts of climate change.
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pure rate of time-preference plus the growth rate of consumption multiplied by
the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, the last term often labeled the
’wealth eﬀect’.
In 2006 the economist sir Nicholas Stern, along with others, published a large
report, in which the Ramsey equation is used, on the eﬀects of global warming
on the world economy, commissioned by the British government. The report is,
as said, very large, but the part that economists most criticised was precisely
the use of long-term societal discounting. Among the most notable critiques are
those of Weitzman (2007), Nordhaus (2007) and Sterner and Persson (2008).
The criticism is mainly focused on the Review’s use of a near zero discount rate,
which thus values relatively high the costs of climate change occuring far into
the future. Among Finnish critical readings of the Review are those of Liski
(2008) and Tuomala (2008). As Liski notes, the Stern Review can be seen as
a massive CBA, and thus at least partially the same reasonings can be used to
discuss the choice of a social discount rate for ’regular’ public investments as
well as for global climate policy.
In the case of very long and very large, even global, projects such as climate
policy, CBA might prove ill-fitting. Instead large models of economic growth
the PAGE model (Hope, 2006) used in the Stern Review could be considered.
While Stern uses the PAGE model to dynamically model economic growth and
environmental change, perhaps the most used model is the DICE model, de-
veloped by Nordhaus (1993). Nordhaus’ model’s basic setup assumes a pure
intertemporal time-preference of 1,5% and the ’wealth eﬀect’ to be on the more
conservative side of Hall’s (1988) empirical estimates. Hall’s empirical estimates
for intertemporal substitution in consumption for this ’conservative side’ are
that a doubling of consumption leads to a marginal utility 1/4 of original level.
Liski (2008) notes, that in the Stern Review, a doubling of consumption leads
to a decrease of only one half in the marginal utility. Finally, as Liski points
out, Nordhaus’ approach might not suit the context of the large uncertainties
of climate change.
Heal (2005) notes, that problems arise in long term public decision-making if an
infinite time horizon is adapted (as economists often do), if a real valued utility
function is demanded, and if a utilitarian framework is adopted.4 As should be
4Utilitarian means here that all generations should be treated equally.
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clear by now, quite a lot of unanimity exists between economists on the correct
social discount rate to choose. This discord is examplified by Heal’s proposal
to use the pure rate of time-preference, which he calls ’utility discount rate’,
when the choice is in a general equilibrium model, that is, when the investment
to be made can have economy-wide eﬀects. In partial equilibrium situations,
Heal proposes the use of a social discount rate. The use of   alone as discount
rate in theories of public investment is quite unorthodox, and even more so in
empirical cases, since   cannot be easily observed and is thus almost certainly
a value judgement.
The traditional Ramsey equation does not account for uncertainty, since it writes
the social discount rate as a function of pure time-preference, the growth rate
of consumption and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. Gollier
(2001) extends the equation by introducing a rather complicated term which
accounts for uncertainty. This added term by Gollier can be thought of as
the social risk premium, which has been to topic of many economic articles.
Most notably the aforementioned paper by Arrow and Lind (1970) builds a
model on a state-preference framework by Hirshleifer (1965), in which the social
risk premium vanishes given a large enough population, a result known as the
Arrow-Lind theorem. The theorem has been the topic of quite a few theoretical
papers, including the contemporaries Fisher (1973) and Foldes and Rees (1977),
the first of which is used in chapter 4. More recent commentaries include those
by Baumstark and Gollier (2014), Fesselmeyer et al. (2014) and Gallagher and
Snow (2014), the last of which is also used in chapter 4.
It is worth mentioning that the original Arrow and Lind model and its critiques
do not comment on the suitable time scale for the social discount rates they
implicitly define. Thus, the results of the Arrow-Lind theorem, whether they
hold or not, can be used to determine the need for a social risk premium in
the discount rate suggested by the Ramsey equation, even in the case of more
short-term investments.
Finally, it should be noted, that some economists have criticised social dis-
counting itself as immoral. Among those who claim intergenerational discount-
ing irrational are Ramsey (1928) and Pigou (1962). This criticism stems from
the utilitarian idea of valuing each past, current and future generation’s utility
equally.
Chapter 3
Public Investments &
Cost-Benefit Analysis
In this chapter I go through the theory of the basic building blocks of public
investment decisions. First, investments and public investments are explicitly
defined in 3.1 and in 3.2, respectively. I note that the definition of investment
in the economic theory of decision-making might diﬀer from ones used in, say,
financial markets or national accounts. Second, the theory of Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis is presented in 3.3. Finally, uncertainty and risk in the context of public
investment decisions and social discounting are discussed in 3.4.
3.1 What are Investments?
The definition of an investment is to incur costs now and receive a benefit for
it in the future. In other words, to invest is to forego present consumption or
revenue in hope of added consumption or revenue in the future. This means
that an economic agent, such as a consumer or a firm, sets aside some part of
the disposable wealth that the agent could have used to increase her present
utility and instead chooses to invest some of her wealth in an asset or project
that leads to potentially increased possibilities of utility maximisation in the
future.
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The object of an investment can be either physical or intangible. This means
that the aim of the public investment decisions can be to acquire anything
from residential buildings to factories, highway bridges to railways and more
abstract objects like computer systems or educational or health care policies.
It can be defined, that the only thing necessarily in common between diﬀerent
investments, and the aspect that sets them apart from simple consumption, is
the temporal dimension.
In the case of an individual consumer or a privately owned, profit maximising
firm this definition of investment is rather straightforward. In economic theory
firms use investments to maximise their revenue across time periods and indi-
viduals invest to maximise their utility across time periods. It is less clear what
is the aim of a public agent, such as state, government or city, and what would
lead to an increase in its utility. To address this problem, diﬀerent versions of
a societal utility function have been proposed in economic theory. What is of
more interest in the context of this thesis, is how these investment decisions
are made. Where as the optimal behavior of a private firm or a consumer is
to choose the cheapest alternative that fulfils some minimum criteria, a public
investor might use other decision criteria such as eﬀects on the distribution of
income. Generally, a public investor aims at acknowledging costs and benefits
from the perspective of the entire society. Section 3.2 discusses questions of
public economic agents as investors in more length.
Since investment decisions are decisions concerning the future, i.e. states of the
world that have not yet come to pass, uncertainty and risk are always present
to some degree. In their seminal book Investment Under Uncertainty Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) describe three characteristics common to most investment
decisions. These characteristics are:
1. the level of irreversibility,
2. the amount of uncertainty, and
3. the possibilities to change the timing of the investment.
Irreversible investment decisions have been of special interest for environmen-
tal economists. Large scale investments, such as dams, are for all intents and
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purposes virtually irreversible and have a potentially large impact on the sur-
rounding environment. Considerations of irreversibility are also relevant in cases
where the extinction of a species could result from the investment. See, for ex-
ample, Arrow and Fisher (1974), Viscusi (1988), and Narain et al. (2007).
Uncertainty and risk in investment decisions can be formally characterised
through the probability distribution of the possible outcomes of an investment
project that is undertaken. Since the distribution is often unknown, ex ante, an
estimate of it is attained, using expected values. Compiling these probability
distribution requires expert knowledge and can be diﬃcult, especially in the
case of large, economy wide or even international projects. Once a satisfactory
probability distribution of the possible costs and benefits is derived, a so called
certainty equivalent should be calculated. Since in many cases the probabilities
are not readily available and the calculation of cost and benefit specific certainty
equivalents can be tedious work, an alternative approach is to adjust the used
discount rate to account for risk, which is the topic of the model presented in 4.
The following section on Cost-Benefit Analysis, 3.3, also discusses the problem
of risk and uncertainty and defines them in a public investment context.
Investors then make their investment decisions taking risk into account to the
best of their knowledge. One general rule that is often implicit in discussions
on the topic is to use higher discount rates for riskier, more uncertain projects.
This is because economic agents exhibiting risk aversive preferences demand a
higher return to compensate for increased risk. The choice of discount rates
and the derivation of the so called Ramsey equation, which defines a Social
Discount Rate (SDR), are discussed in 4. Additionally, it can be thought, that
the appraisal itsel of competing investment possibilities, i.e. the calculation of
CBAs, reduces the uncertainty of the possible investments, as was proposed by
Mirrlees and Little (2006).
The possibility of postponing an investment, and choosing the timing of the
investment so that the uncertainty about the investment can be reduced by
learning more before committing to the project, has been integrated into some of
the decision aid computer programs that have been published in recent decades.
These decision aid programs represent an alternative approach to providing
public decision makers with theoretically based support in making investment
decisions. These programs come from a combined background of engineering,
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economics and mathematics and are left out of consideration in this thesis.1
3.2 Public Investment Decisions in Economic The-
ory
As public investments fulfil all of the characteristics described in the previous
section, what is it that sets them apart from private investments? What is
the diﬀerence between a private and a public investment decision, besides the
obvious fact that the decision maker is a public agent? It can be seen that the
definition of public investment as oﬀered by economic theory partially diﬀers
from the one used in practice, e.g. when a finance minister talks about the
GDP-share of public investments, for instance.
When calculating national accounts following SNA, public investments are equated
with the gross formation of fixed capital as defined in the first chapter of this
thesis. These fixed assets can be both material and immaterial, and are used
in production (of further middle products and/or end-products) for at least one
year. This is the definition used in, for example, Statistics Finland. Public pro-
curement can be seen as a special way of orchestrating public investment. Public
procurement does not, however, fall completely into the category of public in-
vestment as defined above. This is because also end-products can be procured,
where as the national accounts -definition of investment would only allow for
diﬀererent forms of capital as the object of investment. As noted in chapter 1,
the use of CBA-like methods such as Life-Cycle Costing (LCC) in procurement
has increased during the past decades, and these are discussed briefly in 3.3.1.
In economic theory any government action in or through the market mechanism
is often called a market intervention. The market is thought of as functioning
autonomously, so that any activity by the state is an inteference in the oth-
erwise freely operating market. Diﬀerent categorizations of the possible types
of government intervention have been proposed. Pigou, for example, diﬀerenti-
ates between two types of public expenditure: transfer and non-transfer (Pigou,
1947). Non-transfer expenditure means in Pigou’s terminology public expendi-
ture “that purchase current services of productive resources for the use of those
1See, e.g., Beuthe et al. (2000) andMedaglia et al. (2008).
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authorities” where as transfer expenditure is that “which consist in payments
made either gratuitously or in purchase of existing property rights to private
persons”.
More recent classifications include those by Joseph Stiglitz and Matti Tuomala.
Tuomala categorizes all possible government market interventions as either di-
rect or indirect. Direct interventions are defined as the government operating
directly through the market mechanisms, and include public production, sub-
sidies and investments. Indirect interventions are defined as altering the func-
tioning of markets in some way, such as regulations and taxation. (Tuomala,
2009). Stiglitz’s categorisation of diﬀerent types of government market interfer-
ence into three types is: public production, private production with taxes and
subsidies and private production with government regulation aimed at ensuring
that firms act in the desired way (Stiglitz, 2000).
Based on the above distinctions, it can be said that public investments are
• potentially a part of both non-transfer and transfer expenditure,
• direct interventions,
• either public production, or private production with subsidies.
Whether public investments fall into Stiglitz’s category of public production or
one of the two private production categories, is not altogether clear. An invest-
ment is essentially the government, or other public agent, buying something,
for which the costs are paid immediately, or in the beginning of the investment
period, and the benefits are reaped towards the end of the investment period.2
It could be thought, that if the government invests in a product or service that
is privately produced, then the said public investment falls into the category of
private production with government subsidies. Similarly, in the case where gov-
ernment or some other public agent provides for the product or service that is
the object of the investment, then the public investment falls into the category
of public production.
According to Stiglitz (2000), the eﬀects of a project should only be evaluated in
the long-run. In other words, the impacts of a government market intervention
2This is a generalisation. It could of course also be the case, that a given public investment
would require costs throughout its life-cycle, or yield benefits immediately.
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should be analysed after all of the economic agents, who are stakeholders, have
adjusted their behaviour accordingly. This approach presupposes the notion,
that there exists some equilibrium state after which the consumers and firms
do not alter their behaviour, until further actions (by the government) on the
markets are made. This means that, although the idea is correct, in that it
urges the decision-maker to take into account the full eﬀect a project has on
the behaviour of the economic agents, implementing it in practice might prove
challenging, since it is diﬃcult to draw a line in a point in time, when the
aﬀected economic agents have ceased altering their behaviour. This problem
is in addition to the fundamental problem of economic theory of not having a
laboratory setting, and hence not being able to consider the consequences of a
project, ceteris paribus. This insight can, however, be used as a motivation for
the use of CBA, which tries to assume a similar all-encompassing approach in
assessing the costs and benefits of a given investment.
The reason why a government would want to intervene in the working of a
market is, according to economic theory, market failure. Market failures can
be divided into five diﬀerent categories, namely: externalities, public goods,
imperfect competition, incomplete markets and imperfect information (Stiglitz,
2000). It is quite clear, that all of these are present when evaluating the need
for various public investments and even in the investment decisions of type 3, as
defined below. How the proposed public investment decision-aid method, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, answers the problems presented by the five types of market
failures, is discussed in section 3.3.
After defining what public investments entail and how they fit into the public
economic theory background, it needs to be defined just what is meant when
talking about public investment decisions. I now introduce a distinction of three
diﬀerent types of decisions related to public investments. A public investment
decision can fall into one of the following categories, which might overlap:
1. Decisions on the overall optimum level of market interference, through
public investment, on a regional, local, national, or industry level
2. Decisions between entirely diﬀerent public investment possibilities, e.g.
new highway vs. educational reform,
3. Decision between alternative oﬀers, when the decision number 2 has been
made, i.e. if a highway needs to be built, should a section be done as
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a bridge or a tunnel, or, which of the oﬀers for a city-wide tram-system
should be accepted
Cost-Benefit Analysis, an established set of theory in applied economics, is most
often used to make decisions of the third kind, or to assess the profitability of
a single investment option (e.g., Marglin, 1969). Thus, in this study, the main
focus is on the third kind of investment decision. Although such a decision
might seem mundane, that is, the alternative with the cheapest price tag should
be chosen, in the case of public investments and the aim for maximising social
welfare an alternative approach is needed. Economic journal articles around the
topic, most notably the large body of research focused on discounting, take it
as a given, that some form of Net Present Value -criterion, usually Cost-Benefit
Analysis, is used. CBA is the topic of section 3.3.
Even though the definition of public investments I have formulated is rather
broad, we now have a more clear picture of what it can mean. We should
now turn to the question of how public investment decisions, of type 3., are
made. From a theoretical perspective, the idea of maximising a societal welfare
function as a criterion for investment decisions seems alluring, but, as we will see,
is rather impractical. Subsection 3.2.1 briefly introduces social welfare functions
and their short-comings, which mandates the use of a more crude method, CBA.
3.2.1 Social welfare & societal utility functions
The theory of social choice and welfare economics is, of course, not confined to
the context of investment decisions. It can be generalised that a social choice
problem is any situation whene a group of individuals are faced with making a
collective choice from a set of alternatives (Jehle and Reny, 2011). The definition
of a social welfare function is also related to Arrow’s impossibility theorem and
the search for an optimal social choice rule (Arrow, 1951).
A social welfare function is desired to fulfil at least some of Arrow’s character-
istics of a good social choice rule. The characteristics are the following. Unre-
stricted domain (U) means that the social welfare function is defined with all
possible combinations of individual preference relations. Weak Pareto principle
(WP) means, that if all individuals prefer x over y, then the rule should choose
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x over y as well. Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is defined so, that
the choice is the same irrespective of the presence of non-winning alternatives.
Non-dictatorship (D) means, quite self evidently, that the preferences of a sin-
gle individual should not over-rule the preferences of the other individuals. An
additional feature of a good social choice rule is the so called Pareto indiﬀerence
principle (PI), which states that if two alternatives are ranked equal by all indi-
vidual preference relations, then the social welfare function should value them
equally as well.
Jehle and Reny (2011) define social welfare functions as such, that satisfy U, WP,
IIA and PI, i.e. the functions satisfy strict welfarism. The two most commonly
cited forms of social welfare functions are of the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian
form. The Rawlsian social welfare function, also called ’maximin’, maximises
the utility of the least well oﬀ individual in the society. The rationale behind this
is derived from the ethical reasonings by Rawls (1988). The Utilitarian welfare
function, which is perhaps more common in economics, is defined as the sum of
individual utilities, and it ranks competing projects according to diﬀerences in
this sum (Jehle and Reny, 2011).
From a theoretical point of view, the use of a certain social welfare function in
public investment decisions seems justifiable. Rendering the theory to practice,
however, can be quite diﬃcult. First, the individual utility functions would need
to be estimated. Second, the estimated utility functions would need to be such,
that they would allow the adding up and comparison of utility levels of diﬀerent
individuals. Accordingly, as Tuomala (2009) points out, the diﬀerent types
of social welfare functions are mainly meant to be used in abstract reasoning,
and are of little use in practical public investment decisions. Since a social
welfare function is in practice very diﬃcult to estimate, Cost-Benefit Analysis
has been used as an alternative to such functions, in the context of public
investment decisions, even though, according to Marglin (1969) it is only after
the estimation of a societal utility function that “it is possible to make our
notions of benefits and costs suﬃciently meaningful that quantitative appraisal
of economic alternatives within the public sector can be expected to lead to
a higher level of performance than more intuitive methods of decision-making
permit.” Thus, the need for a more practical decision-aid method for social
choices is well motivated. The proposed, and often used, method is Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and it is to it that I turn next.
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3.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis
I now introduce Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), following mainly Pearce (1983),
Tuomala (2009), and Boardman et al. (2014). The basic idea of CBA is the
following. Let us say the government wants to make a large scale investment,
say a new highway, though CBA could just as well be used to assess more
abstract public projects as well (Tuomala, 2009). The government then needs
to have a way of deciding what is the economically and socially most eﬃcient
way of realising the highway. The socially optimal investment decision would
maximise a social welfare function, but, as was noted in 3.2.1, in reality this
is often not feasible. This is where CBA comes in. It is usually assumed, that
CBA is used to make an economically rational choice, i.e. choosing an option
where the gains from a project exceed the losses.
Analogous to the social welfare function, CBA aims at making choices according
to the preferences of the individuals who make up the society. The market place
and money are taken as the prime medium through which these preferences are
expressed. This, however, leads to the implicit value judgement, that the current
distribution of income in the society is preferable (Pearce, 1983). Pearce defines
two normative judgements, which need to be made, in order to be able to use
CBA in societal decision-making:
1. Individual preferences should count.
2. Those preferences should be weighted by the existing distribution of in-
come.
Here, the latter of these normative judgements follows from the fact, that the
market place represents the society’s individuals’ aggregated preferences, but
biased according to the existing distribution of income. If judgement 2. is
rejected, then an alternative needs to be presented, i.e. some other, desirable
distribution of income needs to be defined in addition to a way of ’equalising’ the
current distribution, while using CBA. The former judgement is just a rephras-
ing of the fact, that CBA uses the market values of costs and benefits, which in
turn are decided by the preferences of the individuals who act in it.
Since all of the benefits and costs of the project to individuals in the society
should be included, the concept of consumer surplus is often adopted. In the
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simple case of a linear Marshallian demand curve, the area under the curve, in a
quantity-price space of the representative single commodity, defines to consumer
surplus. Even though more precise estimates of real demand curves could be
estimated, Pearce (1983) points out that “[p]artly because of empirical diﬃcul-
ties, and partly because of the view that the errors are not large, we usually
find CBA studies using ’simple’ measures of surplus.” Pearce defines three ways
of calculating consumer surplus: (a) the area under a Marshallian curve, or
’simple consumer surplus’, (b) the area under a Hicksian demand curve that is
adjusted so as to keep the consumer on his original indiﬀerence curve, known
as ’compensating variation’, and (c) the area under a demand curve that is ad-
justed to keep the consumer on his subsequent indiﬀerence curve, known as the
’equivalent variation’.
According to Mishan (1994) compensated variation is the most often suggested
approach in theoretical literature. A more recent text-book on CBA, by Board-
man et al. (2014), presents the Marshallian demand curve for estimating the
consumer surplus, as well as the Hicksian demand curve, and the equivalent
variation versions. Thus, there is still no unanimity over which demand func-
tion to use.
Pearce’s theoretical starting point for the net benefit criterion of project accep-
tance is the equation
Net benefits = WTPi  WTPj , (3.3.1)
where the benefits of a given project i are presented as the willingness to pay
for it, and the costs are represented as an opportunity cost, namely, the benefits
(measured also through willingness to pay) of an alternative, foregone project
j.
The above formulation is correct in a first best world, where markets are perfect,
and prices thus perfectly capture the preferences of individuals. In reality, CBA
calculations are done in a second best world. Then, WTPj often diﬀers from
Ci, the costs of project i as measured in CBA. This means that the calculated
costs fail to acknowledge the full societal costs. This mistake could be because
of, say, externalities, or, the case when the inputs of project i are not valued
equal to the values of their respective social marginal products.
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When the market prices do not correctly reflect the societal preferences as ex-
pressed through marginal willingness to pay, the problem can be remedied by
shadow pricing, i.e. trying to find the ’proper’ measure of the opportinity cost
of project i in terms of what the various inputs would produce in a first-best
world (Pearce, 1983). According to Tuomala (2009), the shadow price can be
thought of as a weighted average of demand and supply prices, that correctly
depicts the societal marginal cost. The relative weights, of demand and supply
prices, are defined as the proportion of added public demand (Tuomala, 2009).
Shadow prices are thus needed precisely since they estimate the social marginal
willingness to pay, which is what should be used in valuing benefits and costs
in CBA, since we want to correctly measure net social benefits.
Pearce (1983) lists four qualifications that, even a ’timeless’, CBA must fulfil.
These are
1. The benefits and costs must be valued at shadow prices unless we have
reason to believe that the error involved in not using shadow prices is
small.
2. All costs and benefits, to whoever they may accrue, must be accounted
for.
3. The rule is indiﬀerent between who receives the benefits and who suﬀers
the costs.
4. A positive net benefit does not mean that the project should be under-
taken.
These rules can be justified followingly. Shadow prices, instead of market prices
(for those goods for which these exist), must be used, in order to capture the full
societal opportunity cost involved. And, following similar reasoning, all costs
and benefits must be accounted for, or, in other words, both internal and exter-
nal costs must be accounted for. This means that all possible externalities, no
matter how miniscule, should be assigned a monetary value. This second ruling
is perhaps the most troublesome, when applying CBA in practice. The third
rule just states that distributional considerations are not included in this simple
CBA formulation, and the final rule just rephrases the theoretical acknowledge-
ment, that CBA alone is not and should not be used as a decision-rule. Un-
derlining the need for additional decision-aid methods besides CBA, Tuomala
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(2009) writes, that practical implementation requires case-specific deliberation
and thought, as well as plenty of ’common sense’.
We can now rewrite (3.3.1) as follows. If C denotes a sum of all the costs, cor-
rectly reflecting the social opportunity costs, related to a project and B denotes
the benefits, we then have the following ’timeless’ criterion for the investment
to be undertaken:
PV = B   C > 0, (3.3.2)
i.e. the net benefits must be positive, for the project to be worthwhile.
This is, of course, a confusingly simple idea, but the implementation of it is
far from straightforward. Problems arise when trying to monetise ’non-market’
benefits or costs, and by introducing the temporal dimension into the calcula-
tion, things get even more diﬃcult. Another possible cause of diﬃculties for
calculating a CBA is defining boundaries, i.e. which costs and benefits to in-
clude.
Costs and benefits occuring at diﬀerent points in time should, of course, be made
commensurable by discounting them to the value of a certain point in time. The
need for this discounting can be argumented in a multitude of ways. The most
usual arguments (e.g., Boardman et al. (2014); Pearce (1983, 1999)) are: the
social opportunity costs, and, the actual time-preferences of consumers, who are
usually assumed to be impatient, or myopic. This leads to two candidates for a
social discount rate, the pure rate of time-preference  , and the market interest
rate r. Depending on the particular context, either  , r or a combination of
them, noted ⇢, is used. A particular rule called the Ramsey equation, which
states ⇢ as a function of   and other variables, is formally derived in chapter
4. For now, I will use ⇢. Additionally, it should be noted, that the discount
rate does not necessarily have anything to do with inflation, since the rationale
behind individual and social discounting is independent of any expectations of
future changes in the price levels.
Now, since the first preliminary ’value judgement’ stated that consumer prefer-
ences matter, a zero discount rate approach cannot be defended in our setting.
From a perspective of intergenerational equality, the use of a zero discount rate
has, however, been defended by, for example, Ramsey (1928) and Pigou (1947),
and more recently in the context of climate change (Davidson, 2014).
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The net value criterion (3.3.2) can now be written as the net present value
criterion
NPV =
TX
t=0
Bt   Ct
(1 + ⇢)t
> 0, (3.3.3)
or, in the case of a continuous time model, when it is customary to use expo-
nential discounting, we have
ˆ T
0
 
Bte
 ⇢t   Cte ⇢t
 
> 0. (3.3.4)
Additionally, it should be noted, that diﬀerent rules for choosing a social dis-
count rate should be used based on the length of the project, the eﬀects on the
general equilibrium (i.e. local vs. economy-wide), and the degree of rivalry of
the costs and benefits of the project (i.e. public goods vs. private goods).
In the case of non-market goods, Pearce (1983, 1999) distinguishes between two
possible ways of deriving a monetary value for them. First, the value of the
non-market good might be present in the prices of a surrogate market (e.g.,
the value of peace and quiet can be thought to be expressed in the prices of
houses). Second, the value of non-market goods with no surrogate markets
can be found out by inventing a market, usually by asking people what their
willingness to pay for the good in this hypothetical or experimental market
would be. These approaches are theoretically sound, but diﬃcult to implement
in practice (Pearce, 1999). Particularly diﬃcult costs to estimate include the
’option’, ’existence’, and ’bequest’ value Pearce (1983).3
Since CBA is used with the aim of a socially optimal solution, the concept of
Pareto optimality, a situation where no agent could be made better of without
lessening the utility of another agent, needs to be accounted for. In a first-best
world, where prices correctly reflect social preferences, CBA leads to Pareto
optimal decisions. One practical way of checking this is to use the so called
Hicks-Kaldor potential improvement test, as proposed by, for example, Board-
man et al. (2014).
3Here bequest value means the value of being able to hand something down to future
generations, existence value is the intrinsic value of something without the option of using it,
and option value denotes the value that individuals place on the option of being able to use
a certain item, e.g., natural area.
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Whereas conventional CBA implicitly assumes that the existing distribution of
income in the society is optimal, by assigning equal weights on all, i.e. value
judgement 2. is made, there exists an alternative approach, the advocates of
which are called ’revisionists’ by Mishan (1982). Pearce (1983) denotes a further
distinction of two diﬀering approaches within the ’revisionists’. The first is to
derive a single set of weights by looking at a political decision-maker’s objectives.
Marglin (1969) and Mirrlees and Little (2006) can be seen as examples of this
approach, and it is used mainly in the context of developing countries. The
second approach is to let the analyst perform a sensitivity analysis of the CBA’s
results by trying multiple sets of distributional weights.
Pearce (1983) answers many criticisms, mainly those of Mishan (1974; 1981;
1982), of using distributional weights in CBA.. The first line of criticism, that
some assigned weights might lead to an even steeper inequality of distribution, is
invalid in that it does not acknowledge the distributionally weighted CBA’s aim
of incorporating aspects of both eﬃciency and equality. The second argument,
that the weights are arbitrary does not hold, since either they are referenced
from explicit objectives of politicians or, in the ’sensitivity analyst approach’,
they are many and the point exactly is to compare the results of diﬀerent, ar-
bitrary, weights. Finally, Mishan’s critique, that the analysis loses its economic
objectivity since the weights might change with the change of a political regime,
is besides the point since for the ’sensitivity analysts’ the same argument holds
as for the second criticism, and for the single-set weighting the context is often
that of a developing, centrally planned country, in which the weights assigned
by the leading politicians are precisely the ones that matter, from the planner’s
point of view.
In reality, a non-weighted version of CBA is often used. This is mainly because
deriving of such weights is laborous and diﬃcult, and often there is not a single
clearly correct way of deriving them. (Boardman et al., 2014). Tuomala (2009)
notes, that even though distributional issues gain attention in public discussions,
they have usually been averted in CBA, perhaps based on the musgravian no-
tion of separating the functions of resource allocation and income redistribution
(Musgrave, 1959). Boardman et al. (2014) suggest limiting the use of a weighted
CBA to only those projects, whose primary goal is to improve the standing of
some particular group, i.e. projects in which distributional considerations play
a central role.
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To conclude, it should be noted, that there are competing and similar methods
to CBA. These include calculating a benefit-cost ratio and using the so called
internal rate of return. Benefit-cost ratio as a method is quite self-explanatory.
The internal rate of return is defined as the discount rate, which would make
the present value of a project’s net benefits equal to zero (Rosen, 2005). Using
the internal rate of return, the project if chosen, if the internal rate of return
exceeds a chosen comparison discount rate (e.g., the market rate).
In the presence of a budgetary constraint, when the task is not to choose a
single optimal project, but the best combination of projects available with the
given budget, Pearce (1983) suggests using benefit-cost ratio instead of CBA,
since CBA might lead to socially non-optimal solutions. Contrary to this, in
the case when choosing just one optimal project, CBA leads to better decisions
than benefit-cost ratio or rate of internal return, since the alternative methods
can lead to erroneous choices, for example because of a diﬀerence in the scale
of compared projects (Rosen, 2005). According to Tuomala (2009) the internal
rate of return is almost impossible to use in the presence of time-variant interest
rates, i.e. when the assumption of a constant rate is relaxed.
3.3.1 Life-Cycle Costing
Life-Cycle Costing (LCC) is a method quite similar to CBA. The main diﬀer-
ence between the two is that by default only costs are taken into consideration
when using LCC, where as CBA calculates the diﬀerence between the costs and
benefits of a given project, as explained in the last subsection. This means that,
where as CBA suggests going through with a project only if its net present value
exceeds zero, LCC suggests choosing a project whose total costs are the lowest,
i.e. closest to, but still below, zero.
Thus the criterion is
LCCi =
TX
t=0
Ct
(1 + ⇢)t
, (3.3.5)
and the alternative i, for which the expression in (3.3.5) is the lowest, should
be undertaken.
The term LCC is used usually in the context of public procurement, given
that the EU directives and national legislations on public procurement directs
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procurement oﬃcials to using it in tender evaluation. Public procurement can
be seen as a specific type of public investment as defined in 3.2. Given the fact,
that procurement usually deals with smaller and shorter investments, the usual
exclusion of externalities in LCC calculations is understandable. In recent years,
however, the use of environmentally extended LCC tools has gained increased
attention (see, e.g., Sterner (2002); Hunkeler et al. (2008)). A survey of current
LCC tools used in public procurement can be found in Pursimo (2015). A good
discussion of the role of LCC in environmental decisions-making is presented in
Gluch and Baumann (2004).
3.4 Risk and Uncertainty
Following Pearce (1983), I define risk and uncertainty separately. Risk can
be characterised as the probability distribution of the possible outcomes, when
the distribution is known a priori. Uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty
over the probabilities of the possible outcomes in the case when the probability
distribution is not known. In the latter case, coming up with simple decision-
rules is more diﬃcult than in the former situation (Tuomala, 2009).
Diﬀerent solutions to the problem of uncertainty, as defined above, stem from
the branch of economic theory called decision theory (Pearce, 1983). According
to Tuomala (2009), one possibility would be to use expected values, assigning
to them either objective, based on previous experience, or subjective, based on
expert recommendations, probabilities.
There is no sure-fire, correct way of deriving a plausible probability distribution
for the possible costs and benefits. Four possible rules for deriving the distribu-
tion are: maximax, maximin, index of pessimism and minimax regret. Maximax
suggests using the highest possible value of each cost and benefit. Minimax sug-
gests, in a Rawlsian fashion, using the worst possible outcome in each case.
When using the index of pessimism, a subjective probability weighting is given
to the best and worst possible outcome for each cost and benefit, and then this
weighted average is used. Finally, ’minimax regret’ is used by assigning ’regret’
values to all possible values of costs and benefits as the diﬀerence between the
best outcome and the given value. In this way, a ’regret matrix’ is formulated,
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from where the largest ’regret’ values for each cost category are then chosen.
(Pearce, 1983).
The problem with using simple expected value is, that it does not account for
the level of risk aversity that the preferences of society, or individuals, exhibit.
A way around this is to use expected utility instead of expected value. Using
expected utility, a so called certainty equivalent is calculated, which is used
to calculate the present values of the assessed project. Deriving the certainty
equivalents of costs and benefits would require knowledge of society’s utility
function with respect to the costs and benefits in question. There is, however,
no certain or easy way of observing these utility functions, given that we live in
a second-best world (e.g., Pearce, 1983).
An alternative to deriving probability distributions, using them to calculate
CBAs and then conducting sensitivity analyses, is the use of a discount rate
adjusted for risk. The calculation of sensitivity analyses is strenuous, and fur-
thermore, out of the scope of this thesis. The use of the risk premia, on the
other hand, can be further motivated by stating, that risk and uncertainty are
often functions of time, so that the farther a benefit or function is in the future
the less certainty there exists over its value. A risk-premia adjusted, higher,
discount rate takes precisely this into account by assigning lower values to those
benefits and costs that occur far into the future.
The introduction of a social risk premium into the formula which gives us the
equilibrium social discount rate, is precisely what Gollier’s ’precautionary sav-
ing’ signifies (2001). The need for a risk premium in public investment decisions
has been challenged, most notably by Arrow and Lind (1970), whose model is
used as a basis for the model I present in section 5. If the Arrow-Lind theorem
should hold, and no adjustment for risk in the social discount rate were needed,
then the calculation of probabilistic costs and benefits in a CBA would be eas-
ier. As critics, including Pearce (1983) and Tuomala (2009), have pointed out,
however, the theorem does not seem to hold in a majority of situations. Two
critical extensions of the Arrow-Lind framework are presented in chapter 4.
An important further notion by Pearce (1983) is that in the case of uncertain
future costs, we would like to increase their values in CBA, but a (positive) risk
premium does the opposite, since the larger the discount rate, the smaller the
value of costs occuring in the future. Pearce’s criticism is not valid, since, in the
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case of uncertaint of future costs, the risk premium could just as well receive
negative values, and hence lower the discount rate and increase the valuation of
future events. Just like the choice of the social discount rate itself is dependent
on the size, reach and length of the proposed project, so is the justification of
the Arrow-Lind theorem and hence the use of a social risk premium. A rule of
thumb could be, that if the project is not large and has no large eﬀects to the
rest of the economy, then the costs of risk could be omitted.
As I have shown in this chapter, economic theory has many competing an-
swers to the problems posed by uncertainty, risk and discounting in a public
investment context. It should be further noted, that the risk in this discus-
sion is usually a microeconomic risk, which means that natural disasters, wars,
or other such economy-wide ’catastrophical’, macroeconomic risks are not ac-
counted for.4 These answers are, however, markedly theoretical, and hence
actual cost-benefit calculations can be expected to use simpler and cruder pro-
cedures. Given the appeal of conducting a risk free CBA and using a riskless
social discount rate, it is to that specific question that I turn to next, as chapter
4 analyses the need for social risk premia in a variety of situations.
4However, it has been known, that a separate ’catastrophic risk’ variable is incorporated
in the risk premium of a Ramsey equation in practical implementations, as is done, e.g., in
the guidelines by the Swedish Transport Agency (Trafikverket, 2015).
Chapter 4
Social Discount Rate
Investment decisions are decisions on costs and benefits occuring at diﬀerent
points in time, as was defined in chapter 3. These costs and benefits are made
commensurable by discounting them to the value of a certain point in time,
usually the time of purchase, using the Net Present Value -methods (NPV),
that are of the form
NPV =
TX
t=0
Bt   Ct
(1 + ⇢)t
,
where the coeﬃcient 1(1+⇢) is called the discount factor, ⇢ denotes the real dis-
count rate, and the exponent t denotes the period in the future from which
the cost, or benefit, is discounted. To be able to calculate the NPV of a given
project, the investor must choose the discount rate, ⇢. The discount rate used
to assess the costs and benefits of a public investment is often called social or
societal discount rate (see, for example Arrow and Lind, 1970; Marglin, 1969;
Mendelsohn, 1981; Stiglitz, 2000; Tuomala, 2009).1 This term puts emphasis on
the fact that the discount rate used by a public investor might or even should
diﬀer from that used by a private investor.
There is, however, no universal, generally agreed upon method of choosing the
discount rate to assess a given investment, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2.
This ambiguity is true for private investors and even more so when choosing a
1Sometimes abbreviated to SDR (e.g., Boardman et al. (2014)).
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discount rate for a public investment, as is evident from the large amount of
academic discussion devoted to it. Even among the experts of social discounting,
opinions on the correct level of discount rate, and on the correct method or rule
for choosing it for a public project vary considerably (Weitzman, 2001; Drupp
et al., 2015).2
The need for a social discount rate diﬀerent from zero stems from the fact that
the same nominal amount of money, or utility, is worth diﬀerent amounts to
an investor in diﬀerent points in time. The intuition is that assets available in
the future are worth less than the same amount available today, from today’s
perspective. This is traditionally thought to be because of two reasons, namely,
opportunity cost and impatience or myopic preferences (e.g., Boardman et al.,
2014; Pearce, 1983), as noted in section 3.3 as well.
The first argument, opportunity cost, is as follows. If the market interest rate is
r then 1 € invested this year is worth (1 + r) · 1€ next year. If we then ask the
question how much is one € next year worth to us from this year’s perspective,
then the answer must be 11+r€. This is, because, if we invested this amount
today, it would be worth exactly one € next year, i.e. 11+r ·(1+r) = 1. Following
similar reasoning, the value of € two years into the future is 1
(1+r)2
, and 1
(1+r)t
for t years into the future.
The discount rate used for public investment decisions should then represent
the societal opportunity cost, the returns r on alternative investments. The
societal opportinity cost can be thought of as the private, and public, economic
activities that would be crowded out, i.e. not undertaken and partly replaced,
if the public project under question would be carried out (Tuomala, 2009).
The second argument, impatience or myopia, short-sightedness, enters into the
derivation of a discount rate when the discount rate is defined as being made
up of certain elements, one of which is called the social time-preference, i.e. a
measure of the impatience in the society, denoted with  . One of the first formal
presentations of the social discount rate, and one that, despite being formulated
a long time ago, is still used in discussions on the topic, is that of Ramsey
2Since social discounting is not a discipline in itself, the moniker “expert” in this context
should be taken with a grain of salt. In their recent working paper Drupp et al. (2015)
present evidence from a survey on 197 academics that they define as “experts” of long term
social discounting.
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(1928). The result, later coined the Ramsey equation, is usually defined (e.g.,
Drupp et al., 2015) as
⇢ = SDR =   +  g, (4.0.1)
where   is the pure rate of time-preference,   denotes the elasticity of marginal
utility of consumption and g is the growth rate of per-capita consumption. The
interpretation of   is that for an individual who is indiﬀerent between receiving a
benefit today or in the future, the value of   would be equal to unity, where as a
value for   in excess of unity depicts the preferences of an impatient individual.3
An alternative taxonomy of reasons for discounting is oﬀered by Gollier (2001),
who defines three arguments, namely, pure rate of time-preference ( ), the
’wealth eﬀect’ (  · g), and precautionary saving. The wealth eﬀect is defined
as the eﬀect of the presence of expected economic growth g, and thus enhanced
future consumption possibilities, on consumers’ saving behaviour.4 The final
argument, precautionary saving is a measure of the consumers’ reaction to un-
certainty regarding the future, and it is not found in the simple formulation
of the Ramsey equation in (4.0.1). Gollier’s approach is used in section 4.1 to
formally derive the Ramsey equation, which defines the equilibrium discount
rate as a function of the three aforementioned arguments.
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to formally deriving the so called Ramsey
equation following Gollier (2001), Liski (2008) and Palokangas5. The Ramsey
equation, which is based on the original writings of Ramsey (1928), is still
used in academia as well as actual investment decisions some 90 years after its
presentation. For example, the Swedish state organisation for transportation
uses it in its internal guides to motivate their choice of SDR (Trafikverket,
2015), and it is still used as a benchmark framework in theoretical economic
articles on the topic, as for example in Davidson (2014), Ahlvik (2015) and
Drupp et al. (2015).
3The possibility that   < 1, i.e. that the individual would value future consumption above
current consumption is of course also possible but is left out of consideration here.
4I.e. individuals value present consumption possibilities above future consumption possi-
bilities since they expect to be better oﬀ in the future anyway.
5Tapio Palokangas, personal communication, 31.3.2016.
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4.1 Ramsey Equation
I will now derive the so called Ramsey equation following mainly Gollier (2001).
First, a risk-free version of the rule is defined, which is then expanded in the case
of uncertainty regarding the future. The need for an expression of uncertainty
in the equation, i.e. a risk premium in SDR, is then examined under diﬀerent
conditions in sections 5, 5.2 and 5.3.
The economy consists of identical consumers, who maximise their time-separable
utility function u by consuming the single commodity c given the limitation of
their disposable income A, which is an exogenous random variable that grows at
the rate g.6 The commodity is assumed such, that it cannot be saved over peri-
ods, t = 0, . . . T . However, the consumers can borrow and lend the commodity
over time. The equilibrium exchange rate for ct+1 against ct is the equilibrium
price of time.
Next, vt(A, b) is defined as the value function at period t of a consumer who has
the disposable income A and has to pay back the amount b of his debt. The
consumer thus maximises
vt (A, b) = max
ct
 
u (ct) +  
 1Evt+1 (A (1 + gt+1) , ⇢t (ct + b A))
 
, (4.1.1)
with vT (A, b) = u (A  b), i.e. all debts have to be paid oﬀ in the final period.
At date t the agent gets the income A, consumes ct of the commodity, pays back
the debt b, and then borrows the diﬀerence ct + b   A at the interest rate ⇢t.
In the following period, the consumer’s disposable income will be A (1 + gt+1),
and he will now have to pay back ⇢t (ct + b A). Diﬀerentiating (4.1.1) and
equating with zero yields the following first order condition for optimality.
u0 (ct) =    1⇢tEv0t+1 (A (1 + gt+1) , ⇢t (ct + b A)) (4.1.2)
where v0t+1 = dvt+1/db. According to Gollier (2001) in this simple model,
autharchy is a competitive equilibrium. Thus, the utility maximising consumers
do not borrow nor lend at any date t. This leads to them consuming c = A  b
6Since A can be thought of as GDP per capita, its growth rate g can approximated with
the growth rate of GDP. For example, Liski (2008) discusses using the growth rate of the
economy as a proxy for the growth rate of per capita consumption, which is needed in the
Ramsey equation.
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in each period, where b is the amount that they will reimburse of any past loans.
Using this, we can solve an expression for dvtdb from (4.1.1) as
dvt
db
= u0 (c) =  u0 (A  b) . (4.1.3)
Since there occurs no lending, we have c = A, which means that gt+1 now
denotes the growth rate of consumption, and we define ct+1 = (1 + gt+1) ct. We
can now solve the equilibrium interest rate from the economy’s Euler equation,
derived formally in appendix A.1, which is of the form
1 +  
1 + ⇢
=
u0 (ct+1)
u0 (ct)
. (4.1.4)
The expression for ⇢, the equilibrium interest rate, which should be used for
discounting, thus becomes
⇢t (ct) =

u0 (ct+1)
u0 (ct)
· 1
1 +  
  1
  1
⇢t (ct) =
u0 (ct)
u0 (ct+1)
(1 +  )  1. (4.1.5)
The rationale behind discounting is often argumented with two reasons: impa-
tience and opportunity cost (e.g. Boardman et al. (2014)) as discussed in section
3.3. Gollier, however, defines three separate reasons to adjust the discount rate,
namely, impatience, the ’wealth eﬀect’, and precautionary saving.
To consider the impact of impatience on the determination of the discount rate
⇢, let us assume that the growth rate g equals zero. Then we have from equation
(4.1.5) the result, that ⇢ =  , i.e. the discount rate equals the pure rate of time-
preference. Usually individuals are assumed to be impatient, i.e. value the
present over the future, and hence   > 1.
Following Gollier (2001) a certain growth rate of the economy is now introduced,
to examine the eﬀects of willingness to smooth consumption over time on the
discount rate. The presence of positive economic growth means that the dis-
count rate ⇢ no longer equals the pure rate of time-preference, since consumers
expect larger revenues in the future due to economic growth, and hence want to
borrow today against the future. The interest rate is now defined by equation
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(4.1.5), where, since u is concave and gt+1 > 0, then u0 (ct) > u0 (ct (1 + gt+1))
and thus u
0(ct)
u0(ct(1+gt+1)) > 1. Then (4.1.5) is larger than  . This verifies the intu-
itive notion, that the discount rate should be larger in the presence of positive
economic growth than without it, for the reasons explained above.
By looking at the expression for ⇢ in (4.1.5) we can see, that an increase in the
concavity of the consumer’s utility function will lead to increased willingness to
smooth consumption over time. We can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If there is no uncertainty about the future rate of economic
growth, then an increase in the concavity of the consumer’s utility function leads
to: (1) an increase in the equilibrium risk-free interest rate, if the growth rate
is positive, (2) no change in the equilibrium risk-free interest rate, if there is no
economic growth, (3) a reduction in the equilibrium risk-free interest rate, if the
growth rate is negative.
Now, supposing that the growth rate gt+1 is very small, we can take a first
order Taylor approximation from (4.1.5) around ct. The Taylor approximation
is formally derived in Appendix A.2. We get
⇢t (ct) ⇡   + gt+1  (ct) , (4.1.6)
where the term   (ct) =  ctu00(ct)/u0(ct) is the elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption, or fluctuation aversion as Gollier calls it, or, a measure of the
concavity of u. Still another interpretation for   is, of course, the Arrow-Pratt
measure of relative risk aversion (e.g., Kimball (1990)). Equation (4.1.6) is the
no-uncertainty version of the Ramsey equation, and it tells us that the social
discount rate is equal to the pure rate of time-preference plus the elasticity of
marginal utility of consumption multiplied with the growth rate of per capita
consumption. Thus the eﬀect of a certain non-zero growth rate on the discount
rate is approximated by gt+1 (ct). The idea, that consumers want to value
present consumption more and discount future consumption more heavily, based
on knowledge of a positive growth rate, is called the wealth eﬀect (Gollier, 2001;
Liski, 2008).
To relax the unrealistic assumption of certainty on the future growth rate, Gol-
lier introduces the ’precautionary equivalent’ growth rate, following Kimball
(1990). The precautionary equivalent growth rate is the certain growth rate
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that leads to the same interest rate, that would be reached under uncertainty
on the growth rate. The precautionary equivalent growth rate, gˆt+1, is thus
defined implicitly in
Eu0 (ct (1 + gt+1)) = u0 (ct (1 + gˆt+1)) . (4.1.7)
Gollier then writes out an approximation of the precautionary equivalent growth
rate, which is analogous to Kimball’s (1990) approximation of a precautionary
equivalent risk premium, as
gˆt+1 ⇡ Egt+1   1
2
 2gt+1
 ctu000(ct)
u00(ct)
. (4.1.8)
Here,  2gt+1 is the variance of the growth rate and P =  ctu000(ct)/u00(ct) is the
index of relative prudence, i.e. a measure of how much the consumer will adjust
his savings as a reaction of increased uncertainty about the future. Equation
(4.1.8) states, that the eﬀect of uncertainty on the growth rate of consumption is
equal to a certain decrease of the growth rate by half its variance multiplied by
the consumer’s relative prudence. The more prudent the consumers, the larger
the decrease in the discount rate as a reaction to it. A necessary condition for
this is, that the first derivative of the utility function, u0, be convex. Hence, P
can also be interpreted as a measure of the convexity of u0 (Liski, 2008).
Given Proposition 1, we know that, if gt+1 = 0, we have ⇢ =  . Using this, we
can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the precautionary equivalent growth rate is zero, gˆt+1 = 0,
then an increase in the degree of prudence, P , leads to a reduction in the risk-free
rate ⇢.
To extend the reasoning of Proposition 2 to the situation when the precautionary
equivalent growth rate gets other values, and to arrive at a formulation of the
Ramsey equation with uncertainty of future economic growth, (4.1.8) is plugged
in (4.1.6) replacing gt+1. We get
⇢t (ct) ⇡   +

Egt+1    2gt+1
 ctu000 (ct)
u00 (ct)
   ctu00 (ct)
u0 (ct)
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⇢t (ct) ⇡   + Egt+1  (ct)  1
2
  (ct)P (ct)Var (gt+1) . (4.1.9)
This expression of the Ramsey equation denotes the equilibrium discount rate as
a function of all three of Gollier’s arguments, since in (4.1.9)   is the rate of pure
time-preference, Egt+1  (ct) is the ’wealth eﬀect’, and   12  (ct)P (ct)Var (gt+1)
denotes the eﬀects of precautionary saving. Liski (2008) reaches the precisely
same formulation for the Ramsey equation, using an even simpler two period
model using exponential discounting. Gollier (2001) notes, that a similar for-
mulation was reached by Hansen and Singleton (1983) using a continuous time
model, and that the approximation (4.1.6) is exact in the continuous-time limit.
We now have an expression for the eﬀect of uncertainty on the equilibrium
discount rate, which can be interpreted as a sort of risk premium. An intuitively
appealing idea, that public investments could omit this risk premium from their
social discount rate, due to the possiblity of risk pooling, is next formalised by
introducing the Arrow-Lind theorem (Arrow and Lind, 1970) in chapter 5. Given
the rather stringent assumptions needed for the theorem to hold, the Arrow-
Lind model is then extended further in 5.2 and 5.3, to see how the need for a
societal risk premium varies given diﬀerent assumptions about the economy.
Chapter 5
The Model
In this chapter I first derive the basic model to determine the need for a so-
cietal risk premium in the SDR, following the seminal article Uncertainty and
the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions by Arrow and Lind (1970). I
then integrate into the basic model two extensions, the introduction of an en-
vironmental externality in 5.2, based on Fisher (1973), and, finally, the eﬀects
of diﬀering degrees of rivalry in the benefits and costs of the public investment
given diﬀerent risk aversion profiles in 5.3 following Gallagher and Snow (2014).
The model is used to prove, that given certain assumptions, the risk premium
of each individual consumer and the total social risk premium goes to zero, as
the size of the population gets large enough.
5.1 Basic Model
Using a willingness-to-pay approach and examining public investment as an
investment in which each consumer, or tax payer, has a very small share, ex-
pressions for risk premia are formulated as follows. In this simple setting the
temporal dimension is abstracted away, since the eﬀects of risk aversion are to
be examined separately from time-preferences. The results of the first half of
Arrow and Lind (1970), wherein the same conclusion is reached that, given cer-
tain assumptions, the discount rate to be used in public investments should be
one suitable for certain returns, are presented in appendix A.3.
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The economy is comprised of n identical consumers, whose disposable incomes
are represented by the identically distributed random variable A plus a mean-
zero random element ". However, since " has no eﬀect on the results which
are derived, it can be abstracted away for a more parsimonious model. The
consumers aim to maximise their utility, denoted u (A), a continuous strictly
increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Consumers are assumed
to have identical prefences, which exhibit risk aversion. Further assumptions
about the type of risk aversion need not be made, for now.
✓ denotes the returns of a government investment, which are independent of A.
✓ is further divided into a certain part and a random, mean zero risk element,
denoted ✓¯ = E(✓) and X = ✓   ✓¯, respectively. As ✓ is independent of A, so is
X.
An individual consumer’s share of the government’s project is represented by
s, 0  s  1. The individual’s disposable income can then be written as
A + s✓ = A + s✓¯ + sX. For simplicity, each consumer is assumed to have the
same share of the returns. Thus, we have s = 1/n. s can additionally be
thought of as each individual’s ’tax rate’, along the following reasoning. Given
that the consumers exhibit risk aversion, they value their respective benefits
from the project below the expected value, ✓¯. If the random element of the
project’s returns, X, yields positive returns, this is lessens the tax burden of
the consumer and increases his disposable income. Similarly, if X < 0, then
the consumer pays a larger tax, which reduces his income. We define a new
function, w (s), which denotes the consumer’s welfare as a function of s:
w(s) = E[u(A+ s✓¯ + sX)] (5.1.1)
Diﬀerentiating this, we get
w0(s) = E[u0(A+ s✓¯ + sX)(✓¯ +X)] (5.1.2)
SinceA is independent ofX and E (X) = 0, we get E[u0(A)X] = E[u0(A)]E[X] =
0, so that the welfare functions derivative valued at s = 0 is
w0(0) = E[u0(A)(✓¯ +X)] = ✓¯E[u0(A)] + 0
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w0(0) = ✓¯E[u0(A)]. (5.1.3)
Using the definition of a derivative, we can write
lim
s!0
E[u(A+ s✓¯ + sX)  u(A)]
s
= ✓¯E[u0(A)]. (5.1.4)
Now, since we defined above the tax rate to be s = 1/n , n = 1/s, we can
rewrite the above expression as
lim
n!1nE[u(A+
✓¯ +X
n
)  u(A)] = ✓¯E[u0(A)]. (5.1.5)
Since consumer i is a risk averter, there exists a number k(n) > 0, so that the
individual is indiﬀerent between paying it, and facing the risk (1/n)X. k(n)
is the individual cost of risk bearing associated with the investment, i.e. the
individual’s risk premium. k (n) thus satisfies
E

u
✓
A+
✓¯ +X
n
◆ 
= E

u
✓
A+
✓¯
n
  k (n)
◆ 
. (5.1.6)
This leads to the insight, formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. When the size of the population tends to infinity, the share of
an investment held by an individual goes to zero, and so too does the ’cost’ of
holding the risky asset, i.e. limn!1 k(n) = 0.
Proof. The proof to the above proposition is trivially that, if k (n) =  X/n,
then limn!1 X/n = 0, and thus limn!1 k (n) = 0.
Additionally, the following stronger result can be shown.
Proposition 4. The total of risk premiums for all individuals, nk(n), ap-
proaches zero, as the number of taxpayers, n, gets large.
Proof. Using the expressions (5.3.4) and (5.1.6) above we get
lim
n!1nE[u(A+
✓¯
n
  k(n))  u(A)] = ✓¯E[u0(A)] (5.1.7)
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where ✓¯/n  k(n)! 0 when n!1. Using again the definition of a derivative,
limh!0
f(x+h) f(x)
h ) f(x+ h) t f(x) + hf 0(x), we write
lim
n!1
E
h
u
⇣
A+ ✓¯n   k(n)
⌘
  u(A)
i
✓¯
n   k(n)
= E [u0(A)] > 0. (5.1.8)
Dividing (5.1.8) with (5.1.7), we get
lim
n!1
E
h
u
⇣
A+ ✓¯n   k(n)
⌘
  u(A)
i
nE
h
u
⇣
A+ ✓¯n   k(n)
⌘
  u(A)
i ⇣
✓¯
n   k(n)
⌘ = ✓¯E[u0(A)]
E[u0(A)]
lim
n!1
 
✓¯   nk (n)  1 = ✓¯ 1
lim
n!1 ✓¯   nk(n) = ✓¯
lim
n!1nk(n) = 0. (5.1.9)
Proposition 5. When n tends to infinity, the expected value of the project’s
net benefits, E(✓) = ✓¯, approximates the ’correct’ measure of net benefits defined
in terms of willingness-to-pay for an asset with an uncertain return.
As noted by Arrow and Lind, the assumptions made in the above model about
the identical nature of the individuals are not necessary for the results to hold.
The basic intuitition is, that as the size of the population becomes large enough,
the risk share of the public investment borne by any one individual becomes
arbitrarily small. This conclusion leads to the unanswered question of how large
does n need to be, to justify negliging the risk in a public investment. Another
caveat to keep in mind is the initial assumption, that public investments are
independent of each other, as clearly this is not always the case in reality.
The model leads to situations, where risky investments in the private sector are
displaced by public investment with lower expected returns but higher returns
when appropriately adjusted for risks, leading to a Hicks-Kaldor improvement.
In other words, the government could more than pay the opportunity costs of
the project to private investors.
Arrow and Lind conclude on a rather self-evident note, that the distribution
of risk-bearing is crucial in deciding whether to invest, also outside the public
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sector, i.e. public companies with a wide owner base could use the same rea-
soning as the government. The use of the Arrow-Lind theorem in the context of
private firms has been studied by, for example Bednarek and Moszoro (2014).
Contrary to Hirshleifer, who suggested direct subsidies from the government to
firms to incentivize risky investments, Arrow and Lind suggest the creation of
adequate insurance markets as a solution.
Finally, the authors consider the possibility of non-identical taxpayers, so that
the benefits of a certain public investment would accrue to a given part of the
population, which leads to similar results as varying the degree of rivalry of
the benefits and costs of the project. This would change the conclusions a
bit from those already mentioned, in that a distinction should be made between
public and private costs and benefits. This distinction examined in the following
sections, where, following Fisher (1973), an environmental externality, or ’public
bad’ is first introduced to the basic model, and then by examining the eﬀects
of varying degrees of rivalry on the risk premia under diﬀerent risk aversion
profiles following Gallagher and Snow (2014).
The original paper’s conclusions are known as the Arrow-Lind theorem, which
states that a discount factor appropriate for certain returns should be used when
calculating the present value of public costs and benefits where as a discount
rate adjusted for risk should be used when assessing private costs and benefits.
This result is problematized in the following extensions of the above basic model.
5.2 Model with Environmental Externalities
In the basic model, it was assumed that the costs and benefits from the public
investment were private goods or bads. In fact, as will be seen from the results
of this extension of the basic model, and from the further extension in 5.3, the
results of the Arrow-Lind theorem critically hinge upon this very assumption.
Following Fisher (1973) an environmental externality is now introduced to the
basic model presented in 5.
We thus define, that the public investment not only yields the return ✓/n to
each consumer, but additionally produces a ’public bad’, an environmental ex-
ternality C(m), that aﬀects m individuals. Each of the suﬀering consumers
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in m is identically inflicted by the externality by the amount C(m)/m. We
further define that the total amount of the public bad is increasing in m, i.e.
@C(m)/@m > 0. The per capita negative eﬀects might thus also grow in m, or
just remain constant, and we have the condition, that limm!1 C(m)m 6= 0.
The consumers’ reactions to the public investment are still captured by the
same welfare function, w, as previously. However, as the population is now
divided into two groups, they each have their own inputs into w. There are n
consumers who gain equally from the net benefit ✓, and m who suﬀer equally
from the environmental externality. Since m want to be at least as well oﬀ after
the investment as before it, an eﬃcient investment decision is thus such, that it
maximizes
nE[u(A+
✓
n
   
n
)] (5.2.1)
subject to constraint
mE[u(A  C(m)
m
+
 
m
)]   mE[u(A)], (5.2.2)
where   is the total compensation that could be transeferred from the n gainers
to the m losers. Using similar division as the one used on the benefits in the
original model, C(m) is divided into two parts, the certain costs C(m), and Z(m)
a zero mean random element. The constraint in (5.2.2) can now be written as
E[u(A  C(m)
m
  Z(m)
m
+
 
m
)]   E[u(A)], (5.2.3)
dropping the ms outside the expectation operator for simplicity.
We now define a new risk premium associated with the externality. Assuming
that the suﬀerer is risk averse, there exists some positive amount l(m), such that
the consumer would be indiﬀerent between paying it and accepting the random
element of the externality, Z(m). l(m) must thus satisfy
E[u(A  C(m)
m
  Z(m)
m
+
 
m
)] = E[u(A  C(m)
m
  l(m) +  
m
)]. (5.2.4)
Plugging this into (5.2.3) and solving for  , we get
E[u(A  C(m)
m
  l(m) +  
m
)]   E[u(A)]
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E [u(A)]  E [u(A)] +  
m
  C(m)
m
+ l(m)
 
m
  C(m)
m
+ l(m)
    C(m) +ml(m). (5.2.5)
Since we wanted to maximise (5.2.1),   should be minimised, and thus (5.2.5)
should hold with equality:
  = C(m) +ml(m). (5.2.6)
For the investment to be worthwhile, the usual net benefit criterion is applied,
and the net benefits should exceed the costs of the externality. This leads to a
minimum condition on whether or not the investment should be carried out:
✓  
⇣
C(m) +ml(m)
⌘
> 0. (5.2.7)
If we now assume the consumers to be risk neutral, then we have l (m) = 0. In
this case the results of the basic model in 5.1 hold, and the project should be
carried out if the expected value of benefits net of all costs, now including also
C (m), exceeds zero. If, however, the consumers are risk averse, and hence the
suﬀerers’ risk premia for the externality, l(m), exist, then the results of the basic
model need to be revised so long as the costs, the environmental externalities are
significant. The expected costs of the externality as well as the compensation
  should then be added to the costs of the project. Thus, the project is now
a Hicks-Kaldor improvement, but the compensations should actually be carried
out for the investment to be worthwhile, from a societal perspective.
Generalizing on the last result by writing out the definition of the net benefits ✓,
from the initial model in 5.1, including the random return from the investment,
X, and the associated risk premium k (n), we write
E
⇥
u(A+ ✓¯ +X    )⇤ = E hu⇣A+ ✓¯   k (n)  ⇣C(m) +ml(m)⌘⌘i , (5.2.8)
which denotes the consumer’s expected utility from the pre-investment endow-
ment A, expected investment benefits ✓¯ net of the environmental costs   and
the mean-zero random investment return X. k (n) is defined just as in the basic
model, as the positive amount that the risk-averse consumer would pay that
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would leave him indiﬀerent between paying and accepting the risk represented
by X. We can now write the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If the consumers’ preferences exhibit risk aversion, and the
proposed public investment yields an externality C (m) which aﬀects the group
m, then the net benefit criterion for the acceptance of the project becomes ✓¯  
k (n) 
⇣
C (m) +ml (m)
⌘
> 0.
For the results derived above to matter, the environmental externalities must
be significant to the aﬀected consumers. Fisher mentions irreversible and cumu-
lative environmental eﬀects as such, which could most likely be non-negligible.
If an insurance market was created which could internalise the environmental
externalities, i.e. make possible the transfer of the risks from the suﬀerers to the
society at large, then the benefits of risk-spreading, as formulated in the Arrow-
Lind theorem, could be used in the case of externalities as well. The existence of
insurance markets for environmental externalities are, however, unlikely in the
real world, and thus, the implications a public bad has on the original model’s
results should be noted.
It would be desirable to internalise the environmental externalities of public
projects, because this would correct a clear market failure, and eliminate the
deadweight loss of individuals bearing the costs of the externalities, instead of
the whole society. Internalisation should occur by assigning monetary values
to the externalities, which, in the confines of this model, means that both the
expected costs of the externality as well as the risk premium of the suﬀerers,
together making up the Hicks-Kaldor compensation, should be accounted for in
the decision criterion. This attempt to internalise the environmental external-
ities, that is, of trying to widen the risk-bearing base, can itself be costly – at
times even more costly than the costs borne by the suﬀerers.
5.3 Model with Varying Degrees of Rivalry
As pointed out by Fisher (1973) and Foldes and Rees (1977), the results of the
Arrow-Lind theorem do not seem to hold when the public investment yields
benefits (or costs) that are public goods. In 5.2 a ’public bad’ was introduced
to the basic framework, but no comment was made as to the proportion of the
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benefits that are public and private. Public investments can, of course, have
both rival and non-rival costs and benefits. This idea is now integrated into
the basic model, following Gallagher and Snow (2014), by the coeﬃcient ↵,
0  ↵  1, which denotes the proportion of benefits that are rival. Accordingly,
1   ↵ of the benefits are non-rival. Non-rivalry is here defined as one of the
two basic properties of a public good, the other being non-excludability. The
environmental externality C (m) of the previous section can be now thought of
as the fraction 1  ↵ of the projects ’benefits’, that are non-rival. Benefits here
can mean both benefits and costs, since costs can be thought of as negative
benefits. Similarly, the net benefits ✓ were assumed previously as ↵, the rival
fraction of the projects benefits.
Like in the basic model, the economy consists of n identical consumers and there
is only one commodity. Each consumer receives a certain income A, the mean-
zero random component of which, ", can again be abstracted away. Though
Gollier and Pratt (1996) find that the presence of an independent background
risk, such as " in this model, leads to increased risk aversion due to an eﬀect
called risk vulnerability. The public project produces the expected benefit ✓¯
and a random return X. Each consumer finances the public project by paying
a lump-sum tax, which is now defined diﬀerently from the basic model, as a
fraction ⇠n of the total costs of the project, ⇠. Each consumer derives utility
from both the rival and non-rival parts of the benefits of the project. The
random rival and non-rival benefits are assumed to be perfectly correllated, i.e.
an increase in a given project’s private benefits also leads to an increase of the
same degree in the public benefits.
The net benefits from the proposed public investment to each consumer is given
by
B (✓,↵, n) ⌘ ✓ (1  ↵) + ✓↵  ⇠
n
⌘ !✓   ⇠
n
. (5.3.1)
Here the first term denotes the non-rival benefits from the public project and
the second term denotes the share of the rival benefits, which is equal for all
consumers. An additional coeﬃcient is defined as ! = 1   ↵ (1  n) /n. The
expected utility of the consumer is given by
E✓ [u (A+B (✓,↵, n))] , (5.3.2)
where u is the risk averting consumer’s strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern
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utility function. Defining W˜ = A   ⇠/n, the consumer’s net income, we get a
new expression for the risk premium related to the project for each consumer,
k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘
. The individual risk premium is defined implicitly in
E✓
h
u
⇣
W˜ + (✓   ⇠) /n
⌘i
= u
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘⌘
. (5.3.3)
We now look at the extreme cases, ↵ = 1 and ↵ = 0 , where the project’s
benefits are either wholly rival or non-rival. We get, by using the definitions
and equations thus far
E✓
h
u
⇣
W˜ + (✓   ⇠) /n
⌘i
= u
✓
W˜ +
✓¯   ⇠
n
  k
⇣
1/n, W˜
⌘◆
(5.3.4)
and
E✓
h
u
⇣
W˜ + ✓   ⇠/n
⌘i
= u
✓
W˜ + ✓¯   ⇠
n
  k
⇣
1, W˜
⌘◆
(5.3.5)
for ↵ = 1 and ↵ = 0, respectively. From (5.3.4) and (5.3.5) it can be seen, that
the expected benefits from the non-rival case are larger than from the rival case,
since ✓¯ ⇠n < ✓¯   ⇠n . The variation of the expected benefits to each individual
around the mean is smaller for ↵ = 1. Under constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA), where diﬀerences in expected net benefits have no eﬀects on the size
of the risk premia, the risk premium for ↵ = 1 is smaller than the risk premium
for ↵ = 0, since in the former case, only the private risk needs to be borne by a
single consumer, i.e. we have k
⇣
1/n, W˜
⌘
< k
⇣
1, W˜
⌘
.
Since an increase in ↵ means an increase in the project’s rivalry, and it leads to
a decrease in the coeﬃcient !, accordingly a decrease in ↵ leads to a decrease
in !. Thus an increase in rivalry reduces the social cost of project risk if and
only if k increases as ! increases. Diﬀerentiating equation (5.3.3) with respect
to ! gives
E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓) · ✓
⌘i
= u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘⌘
·  ✓¯   k!  , (5.3.6)
where k! is an expression for the partial derivative of the risk premium with
respect to !, and can be solved to be
k! = ✓¯   E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓) · ✓
⌘i
/u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘⌘
. (5.3.7)
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Equivalently, it can be stated, that the social cost of risk, k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘
, declines as
project rivalry increases if
dk
d↵
=
dk
d!
d!
d↵
= k! · d (1  ↵ (n  1) /n)
d↵
=  n  1
n
k! (5.3.8)
is negative. Equations (5.3.7) and (5.3.8) can be used to derive the following
rule.
Proposition 7. The social risk premium increases in ! and decreases in ↵.
Proof. The above proposition holds, i.e., the partial derivative k! is positive,
and k↵ is negative, if and only if
k! > 0
, ✓¯   E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓) · ✓
⌘i
/u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘⌘
> 0
✓¯ > E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓) · ✓
⌘i
/u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘⌘
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘⌘
· ✓¯ > E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓) · ✓
⌘i
. (5.3.9)
Taking a covariance of the terms on the right hand side of the inequality, and
remembering that the utility function u represents risk averse preferences, we
can write
cov
⇣
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓
⌘
, ✓
⌘
= E✓
⇥
(u0   E✓u0)
 
✓   ✓¯ ⇤
= E✓
⇥
u0✓   u0✓¯   ✓E✓u0 + ✓¯E✓u0
⇤
= E✓ (u
0 · ✓)  E✓ (u0) · ✓¯   ✓¯E✓u0 + ✓¯E✓u0
= E✓ (u
0 · ✓)  E✓ (u0) · ✓¯ < 0. (5.3.10)
Thus, inequality (5.3.9) holds, if
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
  u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯    
⌘
, (5.3.11)
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where  is the Kimball (1990) prudence premium. Since u is a strictly concave
utility function, representing risk aversion1, then the inequality in (5.3.11) holds
if and only if k    . This means that u exhibits constant or increasing absolute
risk aversion (CARA or IARA). This leads to the following result.
Proposition 8. k! is positive and k↵ is negative if u exhibits CARA or IARA.
Correspondingly, the case when the social risk premium increases as rivalry in-
creases is now addressed, and leads to decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
The mean-zero random element of the project’s benefits, X = ✓   ✓¯, is now in-
troduced back to the formulation. Now, the inequality in (5.3.9) should not
hold for us to achieve the desired result, and we geth
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
  E✓
⇣
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓
⌘⌘i
· ✓¯  0
E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓
⌘
X
i
 
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
  E✓
⇣
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓
⌘⌘i
· ✓¯
=
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓   k
⌘
  u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓    
⌘i
· ✓¯. (5.3.12)
This inequality holds, if the prudence  exceeds the risk premium k by a wide
enough margin, that is, if DARA is strong enough. This can be written as the
next proposition.
Proposition 9. k! is negative, and k↵ is positive, if DARA is suﬃciently
strong.
It is, however, also possible that, given certain conditions, DARA exhibiting
utility functions would lead to the opposite result, i.e. that the inequality in
(5.3.9) would hold. We define an auxiliary function
H (✓) ⌘ u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓
⌘
· ✓. (5.3.13)
Since u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
· ✓¯ > u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯
⌘
· ✓¯, and given that the slope of a utility
function representing risk aversion is larger the closer we are to the origin, we
can write
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
· ✓¯ > H  ✓¯    E✓ (H (✓)) = E✓ hu0 ⇣W˜ + !✓⌘ · ✓i (5.3.14)
1I.e. u’>0 and u00 < 0.
CHAPTER 5. THE MODEL 53
as a suﬃcient condition for inequality (5.3.9) to hold. This condition holds, if
H is concave. To see this, we write out the first and second derivatives of H as
H 0 = u0 + u00!✓
and
H 00 =
d
d✓
(u0 + !✓u00) = u00! + !u00 + !2✓u000 = (u000!✓ + 2u00)!
= u00!
h
2  Pˆ
i
, (5.3.15)
where Pˆ =  !✓u000/u00 is the index of partial relative prudence. For Pˆ =
 bu00 (a+ b) to be less than or equal to two for all b   0 and a + b > 0, it is
necessary and suﬃcient that the index of relative prudence P =  bu000(b)/u00(b)
be less than or equal to two for all b   0. Thus, H is concave if P  2, since
a concave functions second derivative should be negative, which is the case, if
(5.3.15) has a value below zero.
Proposition 10. k! is positive, and k↵ is negative, if P  2.
We can also write the following proposition.
Proposition 11. The social value of a public project of uncertain value in-
creases as the degree of rivalry increases.
Proof. The right hand side of equation (5.3.3) represents the certainty equivalent
of the project. To see how it changes, as rivalry increases, we diﬀerentiate it
with respect to ↵:
d
d↵
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⇣
!, W˜
⌘⌘
=  ✓¯n  1
n
+ k!
n  1
n
=  n  1
n
 
✓¯   k!
 
. (5.3.16)
Using the expression we earlier derived for k! and substituting it into the above
equation, we get
 n  1
n
 
✓¯   k!
 
=  n  1
n
✓
✓¯  

✓¯   E✓ (u
0 · ✓)
u0
 ◆
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n  1
n
 
✓¯   k!
 
=
n  1
n
E✓ (u0 · ✓)
u¯0
, (5.3.17)
which is positive, since all of the terms n, u0, and ✓ are positive. Multiplying this
expression with the size of the population, n, yields the change in the project’s
social value as a result of greater rivalry, (n  1) · E✓ (u0 · ✓) /u¯0.
To study the eﬀects of a change in the size of the population, we diﬀerentiate
the individual risk premium with respect to population size.
dk
dn
= [ ↵k! + ⇠kW˜ ] /n2 (5.3.18)
since the partial derivatives of ! and W˜ with respect to the population size are
!n =  ↵/n2 and W˜n = ⇠/n2. Diﬀerentiating (5.3.3) for W˜ yields E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓
⌘
· ✓
i
=
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
(1  kW˜ ), from which an expression for the partial derivative
of individual risk premium with respect to W˜ can be solved as
1  kW˜ = E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓
⌘
· ✓
i
/u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
kW˜ = 1  E✓
h
u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓
⌘
· ✓
i
/u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
. (5.3.19)
Using the definitions of the partial derivatives of private risk premium from
equations (5.3.7) and(5.3.19) and plugging them into (5.3.18) gives us the ex-
pression
n2dk
dn
=  ↵

✓¯   E✓ (u
0✓)
u¯0
 
+ ⇠

1  E✓ (u
0)
u¯0
 
. (5.3.20)
Here u¯0 = u0
⇣
W˜ + !✓¯   k
⌘
. From this, it follows that a necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for the private cost of risk bearing to decline as the population
increases is
⇠

1  E✓ (u
0)
u¯0
 
< ↵

✓¯   E✓ (u
0✓)
u¯0
 
= ↵✓¯

1  E✓ (u
0✓)
u¯0✓¯
 
. (5.3.21)
If ↵ = 0, then the sign of dk/dn in (5.3.18) is the same as the sign of the
expression ⇠kW˜ . As can be seen from (5.3.19), kW˜ , and thus ⇠kW˜ is negative
only if the consumer’s preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion. The
term multiplying ↵✓¯ in (5.3.21) is positive, since given inequality (5.3.9), which
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is a condition for dk/d↵ < 0, the denominator is larger than the numerator
and thus the fraction E✓(u
0✓)
u¯0✓¯ is less than unity. Under DARA and CARA
preferences, the term multiplying the costs, ⇠, in the condition (5.3.21), is non-
positive. Using the above formulations, the following proposition can be written.
Proposition 12. dk/dn is negative, i.e. the private cost of risk is lower the
larger the population, if all benefits are non-rival and consumers exhibit DARA
preferences, or, if some portion of benefits are rival, preferences exhibit CARA
or DARA, and the cost of risk bearing declines with greater rivalry.
Thus, from the above extension of the basic model, it can be concluded, that the
predictions that both private and social cost of risk bearing decline as the degree
of rivalry increases and as the size of population increases, do hold, as long as
preferences do not exhibit strong DARA. To conclude, it can be summarised that
the social cost of risk declines with greater rivalry when relative risk aversion is
less than one, i.e. preferences are represented by a concave utility function, and
relative prudence is less than two.
Chapter 6
Discussion & Conclusions
So far, I have not even mentioned numerical values for a believable Social Dis-
count Rate, and thus a brief incursion into the world of empirics now follows,
followed by concluding remarks.
A recent working paper by Drupp et al. (2015) presents the results of their
survey on what they call ’experts of social discounting’, to achieve numerical
estimates for suitable SDRs for the long term. The survey presents as results
the answers from 197 experts, in whose opinion the long-term SDR should be
between 1% and 3%. The survey was built so, that it asked both the numerical
value for SDR as well as values for the components of SDR, as defined by
the Ramsey equation, and only a minority of the answers are in line with the
result the Ramsey equation would give, given the parameter values from the
experts themselves. It should be noted, that Drupp et al.’s survey used the no-
uncertainty version of the Ramsey equation, and thus no estimates of a social
risk premium was asked. Accordingly, the experts called for more comprehensive
approaches to intergenerational discounting, which could, among other things,
include the use of a social risk premium.
If the experts of social discounting suggest the use of SDRs in the range of 1%
to 3%, and criticise the use of a simple, certain Ramsey equation, what are then
the actual rates used in public investment decisions and how do they compare to
the suggestion of academics? The Finnish State Treasury publishes an annual
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suggestion of the nominal discount rate to be used in project assessment, which is
0.2% for the year 2016 (Valtiokonttori, 2016). This discount rate must, however,
be considered a rate fit for ’certain’ returns. From the perspective of long term
social discounting, the discount rates used by the Finnish Transport Agency are
of more interest. In their manual on project assessment, Goebel et al. (2011)
suggests using a SDR of 4%, which is made up of a certain return part (2%)
and a social risk premium (2%). In the manual, it is even emphasised, that no
unambiguous reference value for the social risk premium exists. Goebel et al.
(2011) also mentions the discount rates used in a few comparison countries as
varying from 3% to 6%, which are diﬀerentially composed of a certain rate and
a risk premium. Sweden is cited as using a separate rate for economic costs and
environmental costs.
As a second best solution, Cost-Benefit Analysis should be used as a decision
rule, since the derivation of social welfare functions might prove too laborous.
To account for risk in CBA, the introduction of a societal risk premium was
suggested. The risk premium can be thought of as an alternative to the calcu-
lation of certainty equivalents based on expected utility. The use of CBA, SDR
and a social risk premium in public investment decisions are thus reasonably
well motivated.
The Ramsey equation was formally derived, to be used as a theoretical backbone
for considerations of a risk premium. The results presented in chapter 4 of this
thesis show, that a comparatively simple formula for the Social Discount Rate
can be derived, so long as the social risk premium can be left out, on account
of the Arrow-Lind theorem. Even though the theorem has been questioned in
economic theory, as well as used in actual choices of SDRs (Baumstark and
Gollier, 2014), by integrating the extensions to the original model based on
Fisher (1973) and Gallagher and Snow (2014), I have shown that its results
hold if (a) the Hicks-Kaldor compensations from beneficiaries to suﬀerers are
carried out, or (b) if the individuals’ degrees of relative risk aversion and relative
prudence are small enough.
Given the originally hypothetical nature of the Hicks-Kaldor compensations,
and the considerable eﬀort it would take to estimate the individuals’ willingness
to pay in each separate case of ’public bad’ that a given project creates, it is the
latter result, which seems plausibe to be used in empirical applications. Though
the estimation of individuals’ risk aversion and prudence are challenging, just as
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the estimation of their utility functions, it is possible (Hall, 1988; Gollier, 2001).
Thus, to answer one of the research questions set out at the beginning of this
thesis, the choice of the SDR is irrelevant of the degree of rivalry of benefits,
if individuals’ exhibit concave utility functions and a relative prudence of less
than two.
On a more general level, and to answer another of my research questions, a
distinction is needed between choice rules of a SDR for diﬀerent types of projects.
These distinctions should include, at least: local vs. national or global projects,
short-run vs. long-run projects. Additionally, depending on whether the section
5.3’s results hold, i.e. whether or not the existence of the social risk premium
is dependent on the rivalry of the project’s benefits, a distinction should be
made between project’s, whose benefits (and costs) are public vs. those where
they are private. One possible set of rules for the choosing of SDR is oﬀered by
Heal (2005), though his suggestions are partly in conflict with other prominent
authors on the topic.
Heal proposes the use of a time-preference rate in the case of discounting the
possible costs and benefits of climate policy aimed at mitigating the impacts of
global warming. The Stern Review, for example, uses a version of the Ramsey
equation, conflicting with Heal’s proposal. Still another approach, the use of
discount rates that decline over time, as suggested by Weitzman (2001, 2010),
was left out of considerations in this thesis altogether. Additionally it should
be noted that, if for example the Ramsey equation is chosen, then, as Stern’s
many critics have pointed out (e.g., Nordhaus, 2007; Weitzman, 2007; Sterner
and Persson, 2008), the choice of the parameter values in the equation lead to
wildly diﬀering results.
To answer the research question on the impacts of an environmental external-
ity on the discount rate, the distinction between long and short projects needs
once again be utilised. In the case of shorter investments, when there is quite
naturally less uncertainty on all of the costs and benefits, including the envi-
ronmental externalities, I suggest internalising the externalities the ’traditional
way’ by assigning them monetary values just as any other cost. If the project
has a long time scale, however, the adjustment of the risk premium, if one
is used, to account for the externalities seems reasonable. An alternative, of
course, would be the setting up of the Hicks-Kaldor compensation funds, but,
as said, the realisation of such an insurance market seems highly unlikely.
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To conclude, it was shown in this thesis, that public investment decisions are of
both theoretical and practical interest. Furthermore, the seemingly trivial choice
of a Social Discount Rate, and especially the inclusion of a social risk premium
in its formula is anything but trivial. Given the relatively non-strict conditions
for the Arrow-Lind theorem to hold, even with private benefits, the use of the
simpler, risk premium free version of the Ramsey equation seems justifiable.
Additionally, it can be concluded that even after decades of academic discussion
no unanimity exists on the choice rule of SDR. A conflict seems also to ensue
in the choice of the values of the discount rate, no matter what the ’choice rule’
used. Suggestions for future research around the topic of social discounting
would include the examination of the Arrow-Lind theorem in the case, when
time-variant discount rates, such as Weitzman’s gamma discounting, are used.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Euler equation
Since, in equilibrium, the net marginal utility of the individual from period
t must equal the net marginal utility from the following period we have the
equation
u0 (ct)
(1 +  )t 1
=
(1 + ⇢)u0 (ct+1)
(1 +  )t
which can be solved as follows.
u0 (ct)
(1 +  )t 1
=
(1 + ⇢)u0 (ct+1)
(1 +  )t
k · (1 +  )t
u0 (ct) (1 +  ) = u0 (ct+1) (1 + ⇢) k÷ (1 + ⇢)
u0 (ct)
1 +  
1 + ⇢
= u0 (ct+1) k÷ u0 (ct)
1 +  
1 + ⇢
=
u0 (ct+1)
u0 (ct)
,
where the last expression is the expression of the Euler equation used in the
thesis.
i
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A.2 Taylor approximation of ⇢ around ct when
gt+1 is small
The rule for a first order Taylor approximation is f (x) ⇡ f (x) + (x  x0) @f@x .
Using this for the expression for the equilibrium interest rate ⇢t (ct) around the
point ct, given that gt+1 is approximately zero, we get the following results.
⇢t (ct) ⇡ ⇢t (ct) + (ct   0) @⇢t (ct)
@ct
Now, since gt+1 ⇡ 0, u0 (ct+1) ⇡ u0 (ct) and u0 (ct) /u0 (ct+1) ⇡ u0 (ct) /u0 (ct) =
1, and we get
⇢t (ct) ⇡ 1 · (1 +  )  1 + ct @⇢t (ct)
@ct
=   + ct
"
(1 +  )
u00 (ct)u0 (ct)  u0 (ct)u00 (ct) (1 + gt+1)
(u0 (ct))
2
#
=   + ct (1 +  )

u00 (ct)
u0 (ct)
  (1 + gt+1) u
00 (ct)
u0 (ct)
 
=   + (1 +  ) ct (1  (1 + gt+1)) u
00 (ct)
u0 (ct)
=   + (1 +  ) gt+1
 ctu00 (ct)
u0 (ct)
.
Now, by noting that   · gt+1 ⇡ 0, when gt+1 is very small, we can further reduce
the expression above to yield
⇢t (ct) ⇡   + gt+1 ctu
00 (ct)
u0 (ct)
.
Defining now the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption as   (c) =  cu00 (c) /u0 (c),
we can write the above expression to the form
⇢t (ct) ⇡   + gt+1  (ct) ,
as used in chapter 4.
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A.3 First part of Arrow-Lind model
In this Appendix, I present the results of the first half of the Arrow and Lind
(1970) article. We have an economy with one commodity and n identical con-
sumers. The model follows Hirshleifer’s state-preference approach (Hirshleifer,
1965), and there are Z possible states of the world and T periods. ⇡iz denotes
consumer i’s subjective probability of the state z occuring. The consumers own
claims, xizt, for various amounts of the commodity at diﬀerent points in time,
given diﬀerent states of the world. x¯izt denotes the initial claim of i to the
commodity in period t + 1 if state z prevails. The consumers can trade claims
for the commodity in diﬀerent future periods, and all trading is done in the first
period. Claims are bought using commodity units which are assigned to specific
time periods, and which are contingent on the state of the world in the period in
question. All claims are constructed similarly, in that x¯izt pays one commodity
unit only in period t+ 1, if state z occurs, and nothing in all other cases.
Prices for the claims are written as pzt (z = 1, . . . , Z; t = 0, . . . , T   1). After
the trading, the consumer owns xizt, which he will excercise when the time
comes to provide for his consumption. vi (xi1,0, . . . xi1,T 1, xi2,0, . . . , xiZ,T 1) is
the strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of consumer i if
he receives claims xizt. Thus, each individual maximises
Vi (xi1,0, . . . xi1,T 1, xi2,0, . . . , xiZ,T 1)
subject to the constraint
T 1X
t=0
ZX
z=1
pztxizt =
T 1X
t=0
ZX
z=1
pztx¯izt.
Given that Vi is a strictly quasi-concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion, and using the state-preference approach to intertemporal decision-making
by Hirshleifer, functions Uiz (z = 1, . . . , Z) can be found such that
Vi =
ZX
z=1
⇡izUiz (xiz0, xiz1, . . . , xiz,T 1) .
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Each individual’s utility, given a state of the world, is a function of her con-
sumption at each point in time. Writing out the Lagrangian and solving for the
equilibrium conditions we get
L(·) =
SX
s=1
⇡isUis(xis0, xis1, . . . , xis,Q 1) +  i[
Q 1X
q=0
SX
s=1
(psqx¯isq   psqxisq)]
@L
@xisq
= ⇡is
SX
s=1
@Uis
@xisq
   i
SX
s=1
Q 1X
q=0
psq = 0
⇡is
SX
s=1
@Uis
@xisq
=  i
SX
s=1
Q 1X
q=0
psq
⇡is
@Uis
@xisq
=  ipsq (i = 1, . . . , I; s = 1, . . . , S; q = 0, . . . , Q  1) (A.3.1)
From the above result it can be deduced, that the ratio between prices for claims
in periods q and m with respective states s and r is:
⇡is
@Uis
@xisq
⇡ir
@Uir
@xirm
=
 ipsq
 iprm
, psq
prm
=
⇡is
@Uis
@xisq
⇡ir
@Uir
@xirm
(i = 1, . . . , I; r, s = 1, . . . , S;m, q = 0, . . . Q  1)
psq can be thought of as the present value, valued at period 0 when trading
takes place, of one commodity at time q, given state s, in terms of a certain
claim to one commodity unit. Thus, the discount rate for discounting returns
occuring at time q, given state s, to the value of time zero, can be found from
the expression psq= 11+rsq . Following the same reasoning, the value for a certain
claim to one commodity unit at time q is
pq =
SX
s=1
psq
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and the rate of discount approriate for a certain return from time q is
1
1 + rq
=
SX
s=1
1
1 + rsq
=
SX
s=1
psq.
Perfect markets for claims contingent on world states are assumed. The return to
a given investment is defined as hsq(s = 1, . . . , S; q = 0, . . . , Q 1). Investments
should be carried out, if
SX
s=1
Q 1X
q=0
hsqpsq > 0,
i.e. when the net return, or, net present value is positive. Using the above
definition for psq we write
SX
s=1
Q 1X
q=0
hsq
1 + rsq
> 0
as the condition. So far, in this model the discount rate rsq is specific to each
time-state.
Further assumptions are made,
• hsq is independent of the returns of the previous investment (i.e. no auto-
correllation),
• hsq is independent of the individual (VNM) utility functions,
• hsq has a objective probability distribution.
Additionally, the states of the world are partiotioned into collectively exhaustive
and mutually exclusive sets Et, where the subscript t is such that, for all possible
states s in any given set Et, all utility functions Uis are identical for a given
individual i. Additionally, another partition is made, Fu, so that the net return
hsq is the same for all s in Fu. Et and Fu are independent of each other and Fu
is idenical for all individuals. A subset Etu belongs to both Et and Fu.
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Now s in the previous formulations is replaced with tu, though Uis = Uitu = Uit
and xisq = xituq = xitq. ⇡it is the subjective probability, assigned by individ-
ual i, of Et and ⇡u is the objective, shared probability of Fu. The statistical
independence between the two partitions can the be written as
⇡itu = ⇡it⇡u.
Then, the equilibrium condition derived from the Lagrangian can be rewritten
as
⇡it⇡u
@Uit
@xitq
=  iptuq.
(⇡it
@Uit
@xitq
)/ i = ⇡uptuq
Since ⇡u neither ptuq nor depends on the individual i, the same must hold for
the left-hand side of the above equation. The left-hand side expression is also
independent of u and can be denoted as µtq. This gives us the expression
ptuq = µtq⇡u.
The above expression, and the fact that returns to investments are the same for
all s in Fu, allow us to reformulate the minimum condition for investments as
follows
SX
s=1
Q 1X
q=0
hsqpsq =
Q 1X
q=0
X
t
X
u
huqptuq =
Q 1X
q=0
X
t
X
u
huqµtq⇡u
=
Q 1X
q=0
(
X
t
µtq)
X
u
⇡uhuq.
Using the notion, that pq =
PS
s=1 psq we get
pq =
SX
s=1
psq =
X
t
X
u
ptuq = (
X
t
µtq)(
X
u
⇡u) =
X
t
µtq
APPENDIX A. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX vii
since the probabilities ⇡u sum up to one. We then arrive at the formulation
Q 1X
q=0
SX
s=1
hsqpsq =
Q 1X
q=0
(
X
t
µtq)
X
u
⇡uhuq =
Q 1X
q=0
1
1 + rq
X
u
⇡uhuq.
This equation tells us that, given the independence and objectivity conditions,
the present value of an investment equals the present value of returns in each
period, discounted by the factor approriate for certain returns at that time, i.e.
risk need not be taken into account in the discounting process in this modelling
of the world.
